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Introduction to Special Topic:
Telecommunications in the Courtroom
It was, in a certain sense, inevitable. The spread of technology
through American society culminated in Time Magazine's "Man of
the Year" being a personal computer. Even the smallest law offices
have acquired the latest technical aids (or worry if they have not).
Only the particular insulation of the judiciary can account for its
late entry into the technological age.
Today most courts conduct business in the same manner that
they did a half century ago. If we were to resurrect a trial lawyer
from over a century ago, the courts would be totally familiar to
him. But the courts now need to change rapidly, if for no other
reason than the necessity of keeping pace with the massive in-
creases in work product and efficiency that the bar has achieved.
Our principal concern in this symposium is the use of tele-
phone technology in the courtroom. The humble telephone, one of
the oldest electronic technologies, is already ubiquitous in court-
houses and law offices. Indeed, it is surprising that its use has not
crept into the court before now. Because of widespread availability
and acceptance by the bench, bar, and laymen, it is the technology
that can be most easily utilized to achieve immediate increases in
productivity and efficiency in judicial work. Its utility and simplic-
ity have led to the sua sponte adoption of telephone use in court-
room related activities over the past decade.
Across the country, judges with no enabling statutes or proce-
dures, and with little in the way of practical or legal precedent,
have accepted the telephone as a judicial tool on an unprecedented
scale. Judge after judge in state after state has used telephone
hearings in an attempt to increase the efficiency of their courts,
saving both the lawyers and their clients untold hours of wasted
time.
The practical aspect of telephone technology in the courtroom
has dictated the direction of this symposium. The purpose of this
symposium is not to engage in an esoteric explanation of legal mi-
nutia, but rather to bring to the legal community a practical com-
pendium of information that hopefully will stimulate the use of
telephone technology for the benefit of the bench, bar, and
citizenry.
The following pages include a discussion of the development
of telephone hearings in Florida as well as a background analysis of
the national evolution of this practice. The emphasis upon Florida
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is not only because this journal is published in that state, but also
because of Florida's emergence as a bellweather state for judicial
innovations. If it works in Florida, it will eventually find wide-
spread acceptance in the rest of the nation.
The American Bar Association Action Commission on Court
Costs and Delay offers a very practical analysis of the utility of
telephone conferencing in criminal court cases. The Commission,
in conjunction with the Institute for Court Management, has been
engaged for several years in the disseminating information and en-
couraging the use of telephone hearings as a judicial tool. Indeed,
they are largely responsible for drawing together into a national
theme the widespread individual efforts of local judges to use tele-
phone practice; the judiciary is deeply indebted to their work.
Dr. Geoffrey Alpert of the University of Miami's Center for
the Study of Law and Society offers an analysis of the utility of
telephonic search warrants, which have been used for sometime in
the federal courts and in the many state court systems in the west
with great success. It certainly sounds intriguing to one who, like
this author when he was a prosecutor in the Florida Keys, has
spent many hours attempting to find a judge close to the scene of a
needed search warrant.
Because this symposium is intended to have practical results,
concrete proposals are made. The proposals, and some of the dis-
cussion, focus on Florida, although they are adaptable to any state.
The state legislature addressed the use of teleconferencing in the
administrative branches of government and called for a proposed
administrative rule to standardize the practice. Percy W. Mallison,
Assistant Attorney General, responded to that legislative directive
with the proposed model rule contained herein.
Finally, in an effort to provide some structure to the growing
statewide phenomenon of the use of telephone hearings in civil and
criminal courts, a proposed rule of judicial administration is of-
fered for adoption. A copy has been forwarded, pursuant to the the
Rules of Judicial Administration, to the Supreme Court for its con-
sideration for adoption.
Dr. Jerome Corsi and his associates offered an article that ana-
lyzes the results of a year-long study conducted in New Mexico
involving the use of telephone technology in administrative hear-
ings. This article is the first published report of the conclusions of
that experiment.
The symposium concludes with an analysis of where we are
'heading with all of this technology-toward using audiovisual com-
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munications to make court appearances. The ongoing experiment
in Dade County involving the use of audiovisual appearances of
defendants for first appearances has proven a great success. The
use of technology for conferencing between cities is growing as
AT&T sets up teleconferencing centers around the country. There
is no doubt that widespread availability of such technology in
every courtroom and, ultimately, in every office, will revolutionize
the ability of attorneys and witnesses to "appear" in court. Re-
gardless of how interesting the experiments are in the area of tele-
phone hearings, those experiments are a passing phase. With more
technological advances, the telephone hearing will quickly lose its
current status as a "new idea," become widely accepted, and even-
tually be outmoded by newer communication methods.
J. ALLISON DEFOOR, II
MONROE COUNTY JUDGE, SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA
Telephone Hearings in Florida*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the State of Florida moves toward becoming the fourth
most populous state in the country,' swelling caseloads are strain-
ing Florida's legal and judicial system.2 Increasing crime rates, civil
litigiousness and the creation of new causes of action add to the
already growing caseloads.3 In order to meet these increased de-
mands, courts have tried many different ways to increase judicial
efficiency.
Although the spectacle of the harried bureaucrat is an age-old
one, the image of a harried judge, or worse, the harried administra-
tion of justice, is chilling." Consequently, despite the state's rapid
growth, which affects all branches of government, the unique role
of the legal system in protecting our liberties requires special at-
tention to the methods that the courts are using to meet the
challenge.
Past attempts to improve the administration of justice include
the revision of Article V of the Florida Constitution, replacement
of a hodge-podge of courts with a lean four-tiered system,5 an ex-
* Portions of this article have been adopted from DeFoor & Sechen,
Telecommunications in the Courtroom, 57 FLA. B.J. 500 (1983).
1. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Com., Illustrative Projections of State Popula-
tions by Age, Race, and Sex: 1975 to 2000, CURRENT POPULATION REPS., (Mar. 1979). The
latest projections reveal trends that may make Florida the third largest state in the United
States, behind only California and Texas, and ahead of New York, by the year 2000. See
Florida Times-Union, Sept. 8, 1983, § A, at 1, col. 3; Miami Herald, Sept. 11, 1983, § B, at 1,
Col. 1.
2. In remarks recently delivered by Florida Supreme Court Justice Ben Overton to a
meeting of the American Judicature Society, the speaker discussed the strains affecting
Florida's judicial system. Expect Delays as Caseloads Swell, High Court Justice Tells Law-
yers, Miami Herald, June 17, 1983, § C, at 2, col. 1 (first ed.) [hereinafter cited as Expected
Delays]. Among the causes cited were severe increases in population, litigiousness, and an
inadequate response to the problem by the legislative branch. Id. Proposed solutions in-
cluded further reform of the judicial system, and increasing the numbers of judges at a rate
concomitant with caseload demands. Id.
3. See, e.g., Kaufman, The Courts in Peril, Miami Herald, Feb. 13, 1983, § E, at 1, col.
1.
4. As every member of the Bar doubtlessly now knows, a justice of the United States
Supreme Court recently revealed that he did not read up to 80 percent of the pleadings filed
before the Court. See Overton, Relieving an overworked state supreme court: Florida asks
its courts of appeal to assist in screening cases, 66 JUDICATURE 371 (Mar. 1983).
5. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (adopted 1972); see generally D'Alemberte, Judical Re-
form-Now or Never, 46 FLA. B.J. 68 (Feb. 1972).
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pansion of the number and function of the district courts of ap-
peal,' and a general increase in the number of judges in Florida. 7
Similar efforts on a national scale resulted in the split of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals8 and a proposal for the creation of a new
national intermediate appellate court.9 In line with these major
structural changes, a less publicized attempt at streamlining is oc-
curring with the utilization of technology to the legal pro-
cess -including the courtroom itself."
Specifically, counsel and witnesses are using telephone confer-
ence calling equipment and speakerphones as a means of "appear-
ing" in court without ever leaving their offices. The potential for
achieving savings and efficiency, in terms of otherwise wasted
transportation time of judges, attorneys, and witnesses, is substan-
tial. This article will explore the nature and incidence of appear-
ance by telephone in Florida and in national legal proceedings. It
6. See generally, Overton, District Courts of Appeal: Courts of Final Jurisdiction with
Two New Responsibilities-An Expanded Power to Certify Questions and Authority to Sit
En Banc, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 80 (1983); Report of the Supreme Court Commission on the
Florida Appellate Court Structure, 53 FLA. B.J. 274 (1979).
7. In his address, Justice Overton noted that the less than twenty-five percent increase
in the number of judges in the past decade was in marked contrast to the 100 percent in-
crease in the number of cases filed during the same period. Expected Delays, supra note 2.
8. See generally Heflin, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of
1980-Overdue Relief for an Overworked Court, 11 Cum. L. REV. 597 (1980); Ainsworth,
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 423.
9. See Burger's Opening Argument for a New Appellate Court, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13,
1983, § 4, at 5, col. 1. The debate has raged intensively on this proposal. See Rx for an
Overburdened Supreme Court: Is Relief in Sight? 66 JUDICATURE 395 (April 1983); Hellman,
Caseload Conflicts and Decisional Capacity: Does the Supreme Court Need Help?, 67 JUDI-
CATURE 28 (June/July 1983).
10. Although this article is principally concerned with telephone hearings, other forms
of technology are increasingly being applied in the legal sphere. The generalized computer-
ization of the law office is well known. See, e.g., Karasik, The Computerization of an 11-
lawyer Firm, 69 A.B.A. J. 1236 (Sept. 1983). Other representative applications include the
advent of telephonic search warrants, FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 41(c)(2); multi-track recorded
court reporting, see, e.g., Polansky & Bartholow, Audio Recording in the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia, 11 STATE CT. J. 12 (Winter 1983); NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS; THE EFFECT OF SPACE AND DISTANCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, PUB. No.
R0032 (1977); and most recently the advent of Pioneers "Electronic Mail," McComb, Court
of Appeals Pioneers "Electric Mail," 12 Ct. CRIER 20 (July 1983). Florida has followed these
national trends see, e.g., FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.070(c) (providing for electronic recording for
court reporting of judicial proceedings, including depositions); FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.090
(providing for use of electronic transmission of documents for filing).
11. Examples include the use of videotaped depositions. Murray, Videotaped Deposi-
tions: the Ohio experience, 61 JUDICATURE 258 (Dec./Jan. 1978). For the use of cameras in
the courtroom and the audiovisual appearances of witnesses, see infra notes 95-96. Again,
Florida has followed (or led) these trends. See, e.g., FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.070(c), (d) (pro-
viding for the use in court of videotaped depositions); FLA. BAR CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon
3A(7) and commentary (cameras in the courtroom).
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will also explore the potential advantages and disadvantages of this
technique and its potential for expanded use in the future in the
criminal and civil justice systems. The term "telephone hearing"
will be used for the purposes of simplicity. It is defined as any legal
proceeding at which one or more of the parties attends from an-
other location by means of electronic telecommunications." Nor-
mally, though not necessarily, the parties will use speakerphones to
facilitate a telephone hearing.
A. Reasons for Use
It is hardly surprising that attorneys and witnesses have begun
to use the telephone as a means of appearing at hearings. The tele-
phone is an ubiquitous and indispensable support device in the
personal and professional lives of even the most conservative judge
or lawyer. Telephone calls are used to schedule hearings, to ar-
range witnesses' appearances, and even to order research.' s In tri-
als, "telephone standby" has become the ultimate state of readi-
ness for a trial lawyer.
The reason for the increasing use of the telephone in hearings
is simple-economy."' What attorney has not spent more time in
12. In its most basic form, telephone conferencing is a three-way conversation among
the judge and the attorneys for each side in which each participant can be heard by the
others:
The judge generally is situated in chambers and uses a speaker phone rather
than a standard hand receiver. The lawyers, in turn, are located in their respec-
tive offices where they may have speaker phones or use a regular phone. Depend-
ing on the nature and significance of the subject matter, a record of the proceed-
ing may be taken either by a court reporter present in chambers or by a tape
recorder attached to the telephone. The judge gives instructions on how the
hearing is to be conducted in roughly the same manner as at in-person hearings.
Hanson, Mahoney, Nejelski & Shuart, Lady Justice-Only a Phone Call Away, 20 JUDGES
J. 40, 42 (Spring 1981); [hereinafter cited as Lady Justice]; see also Chapper, The Imple-
mentation of Telephone Hearings, 7 STATE CT. J. 88 (Winter 1983).
13. See Haeberle, Court Congestion and Delay-Use of Speaker Telephone or Pic-
turephones in Civil Cases When Witnesses Are Not Available-A Proposal, 10 LINCOLN L.
REV. 49, 49-50 (1977).
14. Lady Justice, supra note 12, at 42; Chapper, supra note 12, at 8. A recent Florida
House of Representatives analyst found savings by one administrative agency of over
$2,000.00 per meeting, mostly in travel costs, by virtue of holding public meetings by
teleconference. See infra note 52. A recent study sponsored by the American Bar Associa-
tion and the Institute for Court Management found perceptions of the utility of telephone
hearings to be reflected in the following propositions:
Telephone conferencing saves the court time because the hearings are easier
to schedule, less time is spent waiting for attorneys, and there is less elapsed
time from filing to disposition of motions.
Telephone conferencing has little or no effect (i.e., it neither improves nor
impairs) on most aspects of the nature of the court hearings. These aspects in-
19841
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transit for a hearing than in the hearing itself? This is most dis-
turbing when the matters are minor, or worse, uncontested. Waste
also occurs when judges and hearing officers ride the circuit, sitting
in more than one place. The costs of travel are substantial.15 Fur-
thermore, it has been estimated that the waste of an administra-
tive law judge's time due to travel," cancelled hearings, and miss-
cheduling may be as high as thirty percent.17 Even for a judge
sitting at a central location, time is frequently lost due to the prob-
lem of assembling all of the "players."' 8
In suburban and rural areas, time is lost due to the distances
between attorneys' offices and the place of the hearing. In urban
areas, time is lost due to traffic congestion and parking difficul-
ties.' 9 Counsel may also face conflicting appearances in different
courts or courthouses on the same day.20 In areas other than Flor-
ida, weather conditions may cause delays when one of the parties is
unable to get to the courthouse. 2' Extreme geographical remote-
clude: counsel's preparation, judge's preparation, judge's control over the hear-
ing, judge's ability to manage the hearing, and the judge's ability to ask ques-
tions. However, although most judges believe that the relevancy of counsel's
arguments is not different during telephone hearings, some believe that there is
greater relevancy.
Telephone hearings save attorneys' time by reducing both travel and wait-
ing times.
Hanson, Olson, Shuart & Thornton, Telephone Hearings in Civil Trial Courts: What Do
Attorneys Think?, 66 JUDICATURE 408, 410 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Telephone Hearings].
The Staff Director of the ABA Action Committee to Reduce Court Costs and Delay has
estimated the potential savings at $150.00 per hearing, Judge Spreads Word on Testimony
by Phone, Miami Herald, July 8, 1984, § B (Keys Area News), at 1.
15. While the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, the Florida Keys, is hardly typical in this re-
gard, its experience is illustrative. In the six-month period of July to December, 1981, its
three circuit judges made a total of 70 trips from Key West, the county seat, to the Mara-
thon sub-courthouse (48 miles), and 52 trips to the Plantation Key sub-courthouse (87
miles). The cost in mileage alone was $3,153.60, not counting per diem expenses and, most
importantly, lost judicial time. As a result, an additional circuit judge was installed to serve
the upper and middle keys.
16. For an extreme example of the hardships encountered by a judicial official riding a
circuit, see Corsi & Hurley, Attitudes Toward the Use of the Telephone in Administrative
Fair Hearings: The California Experience, 247, 31 AD. L. REV. 270 n.28 (1979) (recounting
the difficulties encountered by administrative officers in Alaska) [hereinafter cited as Cali-
fornia Experience].
17. See Memorandum from Edward W. Davidson, Southeast Regional Director, Food
and Nutrition Service, U.S. Dep't of Agric. to the State Welfare Commissioners, Region IV,
at 2 (June 29, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Dep't of Agric. Memo.].
18. See Telephone Hearings, supra note 14, at 408.
19. Id. at 416.
20. See Lady Justice, supra note 12, at 47.
21. Id.
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ness may also decrease courthouse accessibility.22 Telephone hear-
ings offer a way to avoid such waste.
B. Origins
Telephone hearings were first used in the west, where dis-
tances between cities and courthouses are great. Apparently, tele-
phone hearings concerning minor judicial matters in California
were occuring as early as the mid 1960's.13 By the early 1970's, Cal-
ifornia was using the telephone for full evidentiary hearings in ad-
ministrative matters,24 which quickly received favorable judicial
comment.23 Extensive use of telephone hearings occurs in states
with small populations distributed over vast distances.2 New Mex-
ico uses telephone conferencing in administrative hearings,2 7 trial
courts,28 and even at the appellate level. 9 A study conducted by
the American Bar Association and the Institute for Court Manage-
ment found that at least seven federal district courts,30 two state
appellate courts,3 1 and the trial courts of ten states32 use telephone
22. Id.; see also California Experience, supra note 16, at 28-29.
23. Haeberle, supra note 13, at 51 n.8.
24. See California Experience, supra note 16, at 247.
25. "The Board had devised a pragmatic solution, made possible by modern technology,
which attempts to reconcile the problem of geographically separated adversaries with the
core elements of a fair adversary hearing: The opportunity to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses and to rebut or explain unfavorable evidence." Slattery v. California Unemp. Ins.
Appeals Bd., 60 Cal. App. 3d 245, 251, 131 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (1976); accord Greenburg v.
Simons Merchant Police Service, 410 So. 2d 566, 567-68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (quoting the
language of the court in Slattery).
26. Lady Justice, supra note 12, at 47.
27. The fifth largest state in the Union, New Mexico has a population of only 1.3
million concentrated on a northwest-southeast diagonal that centers at Albu-
querque, in Bernalillo County, where 32 percent of the population resides. The
remainder of the state is largely rural, and 65 percent of the locations covered
regularly by the Department of Human Services have fewer than 2500 residents.
All unemployment insurance appeals in the state, (approximately 5000/year) are
handled by eight Employment Services Division Appeals Referees who cover the
state in four circuits. This places a substantial and costly travel burden on the
referees. For instance, in a typical trip in the southeast quadrant, Chief Appeals
Referee Dean Harvel, conducted 32 hearings in nine cities, logged about 700
miles and spent more than 14 hours on the road in a 3-day period.
California Experience, supra note 16, at 270 n.29. See Corsi & Hurley, Pilot Study Report
on the Use of the Telephone in Administrative Fair Hearings, 31 An. L. REV. 485 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Pilot Study]. This procedure has apparently been met with great suc-
cess; id. at 500-01; California Experience, supra note 16.
28. See Lady Justice, supra note 12, at 57.
29. Id.
30. Id. See also Luongo, Telephone Conferencing in a Federal District Court, 20
JUDGES J. 48 (Spring 1981).
31. See Lady Justice, supra note 12, at 57; see also Hendley, Telephone Conferencing
1984]
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conferencing.
Faced with distances which are, by standards east of the Mis-
sissippi, quite vast, it is logical that Florida is experimenting with
telephone hearings. The authors conducted an informal poll of the
court administrators and administrative agencies throughout the
state to ascertain the nature and extent of the use of telephone
hearings.3 3 Because Florida is the bellweather of the nation, its ex-
perimentation in this area can be significant.3 4
The results of the poll showed that no fewer than sixteen of
the state's twenty judicial circuits have used telephone hearings in
their judicial systems.3 5 The practice seems to have developed as
in an Appellate Court, 20 JUDGES J. 45 (Spring 1981).
32. See Lady Justice, supra note 12, at 57; see also Goebel, Telephone Con!erencing in
a State Trial Court, 20 JUDGES J. 46 (Spring 1981).
33. The authors received responses from the offices of the court administrators and
chief judges in all twenty circuits. Also responding were three administrative agencies. Cor-
respondence was received from: Ray C. Helms, Court Administrator, First Circuit (Mar. 8,
1983); Dozier Allen, Court Administrator, Second Circuit (Mar. 7, 1983); Nancy K. Summer-
sill, Deputy Court Administrator, Third Circuit (May 16, 1983); W.M. Alexander, Court Ad-
ministrator, Fifth Circuit (Mar. 14, 1983); Robert E. Beach, Chief Judge, Sixth Circuit (Mar.
4, 1983); Elizabeth Gardner, Deputy Court Administrator, Seventh Circuit (Mar. 15, 1983);
Ben E. North, Court Executive Assistant, Eighth Circuit (Mar. 25, 1983); C.E. Limpus, Jr.,
Court Administrator, Ninth Circuit (Mar. 7, 1982); W.D. Wilcox, Court Administrator,
Tenth Circuit (Mar. 9, 1983); Ruben 0. Carrerou, Director of Operations, Eleventh Circuit
(Aug. 16, 1983); Fay P. Rice, Assistant Court Administrator, Twelfth Circuit (Mar. 8, 1983);
Frank Alfonso, Jr., Court Administrator, Thirteenth Circuit (Mar. 30, 1983); R. Robert
Brown, Court Administrator, Fourteenth Circuit (Mar. 4, 1983); Peggy Compiani, Secretary
to Court Administrator, Fifteenth Circuit (Apr. 20, 1983); Frederick H. Eley, Deputy Court
Administrator, Seventeenth Circuit (Sept. 16, 1983); William G. Deitz, Executive Assistant
to Chief Judge, Eighteenth Circuit (Mar. 4, 1983); David B. Douglas, Court Administrator,
Nineteenth Circuit (undated); William D. Wilkenson, Jr., Court Administrator, Twentieth
Circuit (Mar. 23, 1983); Michael M. Switzer, Assistant General Counsel, Public Employees
Relations Commission (Apr. 18, 1983); Thurman D. Burnett, Chief, Bureau of Unemploy-
ment Compensation (Apr. 15, 1983); Thomas C. Oldham, Assistant Director, Division of
Administrative Hearings (Jan. 26, 1983).
In footnotes 35-81, reference will be made to this correspondence, indicating the name,
title, and the judicial circuit or administrative agency designation. Copies of the correspon-
dence are on file with the authors and with the University of Miami Law Review office.
34. "Florida has emerged as an increasingly important state. It has, in fact, surpassed
California as the premier bellweather state." Naisbitt & Kuypero-Denlinger, Why the Fu-
ture Belongs to Florida, 25 FLA. TREND 50, 52 (Apr. 1983). In the legal realm, Florida has
also broken ground in the area of interest on legal trust accounts. See Krawso, IOLTA pro-
grams gaining momentum, 67 JUDICATURE 49 (June/July 1983); Rivlin, I.O.L.T.A. Gains Mo-
mentum Nationwide, 69 A.B.A. J. 1036 (Aug. 1983); and in allowing cameras in the court-
room, Chandler v. State, 449 U.S. 560 (1981); Smith & Powell, Fair Trial-Free Press: The
Camera in the Courtroom Dilemma Continues, 3 NOVA L.J. 11 (1979).
35. Those circuits that use telephone hearings more frequently are the 1st, 3rd, 5th,
6th, 11th, 13th, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 20th. Those that use it less frequently are the 2nd, 7th,
10th, 12th, 14th, and 15th. See supra note 33.
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early as the mid-1970's. 31 Only a small minority of circuits reported
no use of the practice in any fashion.37 Of those indicating that the
practice has been permitted, six reported that the practice was rel-
atively infrequent. 38 The most extensive use of the practice is in
the Eighteenth Circuit. This is probably due to the fact that it is a
long circuit with four population centers, each served by a func-
tional courthouse. 39 The circuit's adoption of elaborate rules for al-
lowing telephone hearings has facilitated its use.4 0 As a result, the
practice appears to be common to all judges in the circuit.4" Sev-
eral jurisdictions reported that the use of telephone hearings is re-
stricted to relatively simple, non-testimonial matters.42 Others
have tried limited taking of testimony with success.43 Several juris-
dictions, particularly those with outlying courthouses, report that
they allow first appearances to be made by telephone." Generally
36. Judge John R. Beranak, then of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, now of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, issued a Notice of Instruction concerning telephone hearings in
early 1976. A copy is on file with the authors and the University of Miami Law Review
office.
37. Correspondence from W.M. Alexander, Court Administrator, Fourth Circuit; Ben
North, Court Executive Assistant, Eighth Circuit; C.E. Limpus, Court Administrator, Ninth
Circuit, David Douglas, Court Administrator, Nineteenth Circuit. See supra note 33.
38. See supra note 33.
39. See 56 FLA. B.J. at 261-63 (Directory Issue, Sept. 1982).
40. See memorandum from Philip F. Nohrr, President of the Brevard County Bar As-
sociation, to its members, June 25, 1980. A copy is on file with the authors and the Univer-
sity of Miami Law Review office.
41. FLORIDA JUDGES HANDBOOK § 4.7 (1981).
42. Correspondence from Nancy Summersill, Deputy Court Administrator, Third Cir-
cuit; Elizabeth Gardner, Deputy Court Administrator; Seventh Circuit. See supra note 33.
43. Correspondence from Ray Helms, Court Administrator, First Circuit; Robert Beach,
Chief Judge, Sixth Circuit. See supra note 33 and infra note 77.
44. Correspondence from W.D. Wilcox, Court Administrator, Tenth Circuit; R. Robert
Brown, Court Administrator, Fourteenth Circuit. In the authors' experience, the Sixteenth
Circuit also uses this practice. An informal opinion of an Assistant Attorney General notes
that the issue had never been litigated, but discourages the practice. See Re: Opinion Re-
quest on Whether a Judicial Officer May Conduct a First Appearance Hearing by Phone
Conference, advisory opinion of John W. Tiedemann, Assistant Attorney General to Marc
A. Cianca, County Judge (February 22, 1983). The Assistant Attorney General's concerns
centered on the appearance of assembly-line justice and questioned whether this constitutes
an appearance as required by FLA. R. CRIM. PRO. 3.130(b)(1). Id. at 1-4. The authors share
this concern but feel that the opinion ignores the utility of teleconferencing for first appear-
ances to both the court and the defendant. Certainly not every case (e.g., murder or drug
trafficking) is appropriate for a telephone first appearance. However, a DUI defendant, in a
circuit where the weekend duty judge is 50 miles away, would probably prefer a telephone
first appearance to the wait for transportation to the judge.
One of the authors uses teleconferencing for first appearances extensively. Normally,
the practice is restricted to misdemeanors and third degree felonies. Cases involving more
serious offenses, complicated fact patterns, and multiple charges are not done in this man-
ner. All normal first appearance procedures are complied with when utilizing the telephone.
1984]
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speaking, circuits with several courthouses spread over large dis-
tances45 were more likely to use the practice than those whose legal
infrastructure is concentrated around a central courthouse.46 The
stimuli of one or more judges enthused over the practice makes
quite a difference.47 One jurisdiction reports that early and fre-
quent use of the practice declined significantly when the pro-
pounding judge left the circuit.4 8
Facing ever greater distance problems, the Division of Admin-
istrative Hearings of the Florida Department of Administration
uses telephone hearings extensively. Administrative hearings are
generally held in Tallahassee, but involve counsel from around the
State. The division allows telephone hearings for procedural mat-
ters, but indicates that there is "no apparent legal obstacle" to
holding the hearings themselves in this fashion, though it is not
now its practice.49 Other administrative agencies have used tele-
phone hearings even more extensively. The Bureau of Unemploy-
ment conducts several thousand appeals a year in this manner,50
and the practice has been held in context not to be a denial of due
process. 1 Still other administrative agencies reported extensive use
of telephone hearings. 2
The presence of a public defender, and of a court reporter, help to preserve decorum. Fi-
nally, each defendant is presented the option of a live first appearance. The author has yet
to find a defendant who felt that the telephone hearing was unacceptable; apparently defen-
dants are less bothered by technology than judges and assistant attorney generals.
45. Correspondence from Ray Helms, Court Administrator, First Circuit, R. Robert
Brown, Court Administrator, Fourteenth Circuit; David Hawkins, Court Administrator, Six-
teenth Circuit; William Deitz, Executive Assistant to Chief Judge, Eighteenth Circuit. See
supra note 33.
46. The Fourth Circuit does not utilize telephone hearings. Correspondence from W.M.
Alexander, Court Administrator, Fourth Circuit. Not surprisingly, a significant percentage
of its bar is located within a few miles of its principal courthouse. Id.
47. Generally, this enthusiasm was gained while in practice, before assuming the bench.
See Lady Justice, supra note 12, at 57.
48. Correspondence from Peggy Compiani, Secretary to Court Administrator, Fifteenth
Circuit. The author did note a "renewed interest" of late. Id.
49. Correspondence from Thomas Oldham, Assistant Director, Division of Administra-
tive Hearings.
50. Correspondence from Thurman Burnett, Chief, Bureau of Unemployment Compen-
sation. Approximately 25 percent of the Bureau's 30,000 annual hearings are conducted by
telephone, with great success. Id.
51. See infra notes 54-55.
52. Correspondence from Michael Switzes' Assistant General Counsel, Public Employ-
ees Relations Commission, under the Department of Professional Responsibility, the regula-
tory boards have made the most extensive use of telephone conference calls to replace pub-
lic meetings, increasing from five such conference calls in 1979-80 to forty-five in 1981-82.
House of Representatives Committee on Governmental Operations, Staff Analysis of FLA.
H.B. 1257, 1982 Reg. Sess. at 1. This has been estimated to result in substantial savings
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What little case law exists on the subject seems to approve of
the use of telephone hearings. Judge Beranek's dicta in Glades
General Hospital v. Louis53 proposed a telephonic deposition as a
solution to an impasse in a civil case. In Greenberg v. Simms
Merchant Police Service,54 the First District Court of Appeal ap-
proved the use of telephone hearings in an unemployment appeal
case, despite the absence of specific authorization in the statutes or
rules of procedure. Inothe case of Jamason v. State,55 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal sanctioned the use of telephones for an
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
No circuit using the procedure, whether extensively or not, ex-
pressed any negative experiences or opinions. Many stressed the
potential savings in time and money to out of town counsel and
witnesses (or to the counties paying for the witness's appear-
ance).57 One administrator whose circuit makes extensive use of
telephone hearings stated that, "if the State of Florida would use
the telephone system more, it would save the counties a tremen-
dous amount of money. ' '5 s An assistant to a court administrator
aptly noted that the biggest impediment to its widespread use
would be resistance to change by attorneys and judges.59
It is interesting to note that similar efforts are underway to
expand the use of teleconferencing in the legislative and executive
branches of Florida government.6 °
primarily due to lower travel expenditures: $350 cost for a meeting conducted by telephone
versus $2,750.00 for a face-to-face meeting. Id. at 3.
53. 411 So. 2d 1318, 1320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (Beranak, J., concurring specially).
54. 410 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The Court relied upon and cited extensively
from Slattery v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 60 Cal. App. 3d 245, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1976).
55. 447 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
56. The court noted that such practices "demand the exercise of judicial discretion to a
high degree." Id. at 896. The following question was then certified to the Supreme Court of
Florida pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4); "Whether the willful refusal to obey a
telephonic order (in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus) issued by a court of general
jurisdiction, and based upon an oral application therefore by an attorney for the individual
said to illegally restrained, may constitute criminal contempt." Id. at 896.
57. Correspondence from Ray Helms, Court Administrator, First Circuit; Dozier Allen,
Court Administrator, Second Circuit; Fay Rice, Assistant Court Administrator, Twelfth Cir-
cuit. See supra note 33.
58. Correspondence from Ray Helms, Court Administrator, First Circuit.
59. For an excellent discussion of all the various impediments encountered in the im-
plementation of the use of telephone hearings, see Chapper, supra note 12.
60. Senator Nudges State to Leap into Information Age, Miami Herald, Jan. 23, 1983,
§ D, at 1, col. 1. This article noted the efforts of Senator Edgar Dunn (D.-Ormond Beach
and member of the Florida Bar) to cut state travel budgets by widespread adoption of
teleconferencing as a substitute for face-to-face meetings. See also infra note 69.
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II. PROCEDURES
Florida has no uniform, statewide regulations controlling tele-
phone hearings. There are no directly controlling provisions in the
Florida Statutes or the rules of civil or criminal procedure. 1 Only
one circuit has uniform, circuit-wide rules regulating the practice.2
Regulation is generally achieved on an ad hoc basis, or by rule
adopted by each judge, stipulation of the parties, or by a combina-
tion of these. Accordingly, there is great variation. Some courts re-
quire stipulation of the parties, 63 others require only notice, 64
others have procedures for the practice even over the objection of
one side or the other.6 5 Some courts limit the use of telephone
hearings to simple non-evidentiary matters,6 6 while still others al-
low the taking of testimony in limited instances. 7
Comments by those persons interviewed indicate that there is
a reluctance to interfere with a method that works well. One ad-
ministrator whose circuit uses the practice summed up the circuit
judges' feelings by stating, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."6"
It probably serves the needs of all concerned to continue to
allow local experimentation in this area so that various techniques
may be tried. It is equally clear that the trend toward uniform
statewide standards has begun. A state statute adopted in the 1982
session mandated the adoption of rules of procedure by all admin-
istrative agencies using teleconferencing for public meetings and
hearings.6 9 Any statewide procedures must balance the need for
61. Nor is there a controlling provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or the Federal Rules of Evidence. Annot., 80 A.L.R.
3d 1212, 1213 (1977). However, telephonic search warrants are authorized. FED. R. CraM. P.
41(c)(2). A few states have adopted statewide regulations governing telephone hearings.
WASH. R. App. P. 17.5(e); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 1963, 917.
62. See Correspondence from William G. Deitz, Executive Assistant to the Chief Judge,
Eighteenth Circuit, supra note 33.
63. Correspondence from Nancy K. Summersill, Deputy Court Administrator, Third
Circuit, supra note 33; Fred F. Hooten, Court Administrator, Fifth Circuit, supra note 33.
64. Correspondence from William D. Wilkinson, Sr., Court Administrator, Twentieth
Circuit, supra note 33.
65. Correspondence from Philip F. Nohrr, President of the Brevard County Bar Associ-
ation (June 25, 1980) (available in University of Miami Low Review office).
66. Correspondence from Elizabeth Gardner, Deputy Administrator, Seventh Circuit;
see supra note 33.
67. Correspondence from Ray C. Helms, Court Administrator, First Circuit; see supra
note 33; Robert E. Beach, Chief Judge, Sixth Circuit; see supra note 33. See supra note 22
and accompanying text.
68. Correspondence from William D. Wilkinson, Sr., Court Administrator, Twentieth
Circuit, supra note 33.
69. 1983 Fla. Laws ch. 82-273, §§ 2, 3 amended FLA. STAT. § 120.52 to add: " 'Communi-
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positive regulation to implement the approach where it may not be
well received with the need to guard against stifling local
initiative. 0
III. ISSUES
Whether regulated on an ad hoc basis, by local rules, or ulti-
mately, by state-wide rules, there are certain issues raised in the
context of telephone hearings that we must address. Some of these
issues are philosophical and some are practical. Foremost among
them is the determination of the types of matters to be conducted
by telephone. Because telephone conferencing by speakerphone
theoretically is adaptable to any legal context, including trials,7 ' or
even on the appellate level,72 certain threshold decisions must be
made.
cations media technology' means the electronic transmission of printed matter, audio, full
motion video, freeze-frame video, compressed video, and digital video by any method
available."
The bill further amended FLA. STAT. § 120.53 to add:
(6) Each state agency, as defined in s. 216.011, shall adopt rules providing a
procedure for conducting meetings, hearings, and workshops, and for taking evi-
dence, testimony, and argument at such meetings, hearings, and workshops, by
means of communications media technology. The rules shall provide that all evi-
dence, testimony, and argument presented shall be afforded equal consideration,
regardless of the method of communication. If a meeting, hearing, or workshop
is to be conducted by means of communications media technology, or if attend-
ance may be provided by such means, the notice shall so state. The notice for
meetings, hearings, and workshops utilizing communications media technology
shall state how persons interested in attending may do so and shall name loca-
tions, if any, where communications media technology facilities will be available.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to diminish the public's right to
inspect public records under chapter 119. Limiting points of access to meetings,
hearings, and workshops subject to the provisions of s. 286.011 to places not
normally open to the public shall be presumed to violate the right of access of
the public, and any official action taken under such circumstances is void and of
no effect. Other laws relating to public meetings, hearings, and workshops, in-
cluding penal and remedial provisions, shall apply to meetings, hearings, and
workshops conducted by means of communications media technology, and shall
be liberally construed in their application to such meetings, hearings, and
workshops.
The Act took effect October 1, 1983. The office of the Florida Attorney General has drafted
model rules to implement the statute. Correspondence from Percy W. Mallinson, Jr., Assis-
tant Attorney General to J. Allison DeFoor, II (June 30, 1983) (available in the University
of Miami Law Review office).
70. See Chapper, supra note 12.
71. See Lady Justice, supra note 12, at 46; see Goebel, Telephone Conferencing in a
State Trial Court, 20 JUDGES J., 46 (Spring 1981).
72. See Lady Justice, supra note 12, at 46; see Hendley, Telephone Conferencing in an
Appellate Court, 20 JUDGES J., 45 (Spring 1981).
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Depositions are one logical area of application. If the court re-
porter and witnesses are together in a place equipped with
speakerphones, it is conceivable that the attorneys could be any-
where else in the world.73
As to telephone use in hearings, the threshold decision is
whether evidentiary matters will be heard or whether the use will
be restricted to non-evidentiary matters. All jurisdictions allowing
telephone hearings allow them for non-evidentiary hearings. In-
deed, it is for the routine non-testimonial hearing that the tele-
phone hearing is best suited. 4
In California and New Mexico, full-blown evidentiary hearings
in administrative matters are being conducted with great success.71
The witnesses testify from one or more places while the hearing
officer sits elsewhere. 71 One of the authors has experimented in us-
ing telephone hearings in small claims cases. Upon stipulation of
the parties, an entire trial was conducted in this fashion, with the
court in Plantation Key, the plaintiff in Key Largo, and the defen-
dant in Sarasota.7 It is doubtful that a serious criminal or civil
matter would be conducted in this manner, though there are as-
pects of any trial that might be so conducted. Expert testimony
seems particularly well-suited for this approach. Even if telephone
73. See Haeberle, supra note 13, at 60-63. Cf. Glades General Hosp. v. Louis, 411 So. 2d
1318, 1320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (Beranek, J., concurring specially). One of the authors used
this technique while serving as narcotics prosecutor in the Florida Keys, a jurisdiction cov-
ering 120 miles and three courthouses. After two months of driving down a busy federal
highway attending depositions of a small pool of law enforcement personnel, it became ap-
parent that there had to be a better way. Speakerphones were installed at each courthouse
allowing attendance by counsel at depositions attended on-site by the witnesses, court re-
porter, and defense counsel. On one occasion, the defense counsel and the prosecutor were
present in their respective offices in Key West deposing a single witness for 15 minutes in
Marathon, Florida, some 45 miles (and one hour's drive) away. The savings are apparent.
74. See Lady Justice, supra note 12, at 40, 42, 48-49.
75. See California Experience, supra note 16 at 247-48; Pilot Study, supra note 27.
76. See California Experience, supra note 16 at 252.
77. Key Lane Supply, Inc. v. Leach, No. 83-26-SP-16 (Monroe County Ct. June 1,
1983). In this case, both sides requested that the case be heard in their home counties
(Monroe for the plaintiff, and Sarasota for the defendant), and the amount in issue
($517.67) precluded a trial in the other's choice of forum. After stipulation by both parties
to a telephone trial, the court's pre-trial order directed each side to be available by phone at
a pre-arranged time, with a witness and a notary public present, for determining the iden-
tity and the swearing in of witnesses.
The testimony of the parties and of one supplement witness was taken. After a ruling
on liability, an amicable settlement was achieved. After the case, the plaintiff communicated
to the court that "[tihe idea of a telephone hearing such as you conducted is clearly recom-
mended. The savings in time and expense means all the difference in the world on small
cases such as this." Correspondence from Saul Lane, of Key Lane Supply, Inc., to Judge J.
Allison DeFoor, II (June 9, 1983) (available in the University of Miami Law Review office).
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hearings are restricted to non-testimonial matters, it does not sig-
nificantly limit the application of telephone conferencing to most
cases. Few cases today, whether civil or criminal, involve trials, but
virtually all involve one or more non-testimonial court
appearances.78
A closely related issue is the complexity of matters to be ar-
gued by telephone. Even if limited to non-evidentiary motion prac-
tice, are all motions arguable in this fashion? Although routine
matters are ideally suited for telephone hearings, it is less clear
whether the resolution of complex, detailed legal issues is suited
for telephone practice.7 9 Furthermore, the question arises whether
the court will permit "split" hearings-in which one counsel ap-
pears by phone and the other appears in person. 0
A final question is whether telephone hearings will be allowed
only upon the stipulation of the parties. Counsel should be allowed
the option of appearing in person. Should counsel be able to pre-
vent opposing counsel from conducting his or her portion by tele-
phone? On the one hand, the objections may be legitimate based
upon the complexity of the issues raised; on the other hand, an ill-
founded objection should not be allowed to needlessly inconve-
nience opposing counsel. The Eighteenth Circuit, which has the
most sophisticated rules regarding telephone hearings, provides for
the resolution of such disputes between opposing counsel by per-
mitting courts to hold a telephone hearing over one attorney's
objections."
It should be remembered that telephone hearings remain only
a tool to be applied for the convenience of the parties or the court.
Even where this technique is used frequently, it has not replaced
live courtroom practice. 2
78. See Lady Justice, supra note 12 at 40.
79. Id. at 48-49.
80. Attorneys are often concerned about split hearings, presumably because of the pos-
sibility that the attorney physically present might gain some advantage over the attorney
appearing by telephone. This might occur because the party physically present is able to
observe the judge's reaction to argument. See Telephone Hearings, supra note 14, at 411.
The mirror image of this concern would be the ability of the party present to communicate
silently, with body language (rolled eyes, shrugged shoulders, or even finger clasping his
nose). The authors whimsically have dubbed this the "Chevy Chase" factor, after the actor
who formerly appeared on NBC's "Saturday Night Live." One of his acts consisted of such
conduct, carried on behind the back of his foil, Roseann Roseannadana.
81. Correspondence from Philip F. Nohrr, President of the Brevard County Bar Associ-
ation, supra note 40, 1.
82. "Even heavy users of telephone conferencing estimate that only 40 percent of the
court's motion hearing [sic] was conducted by phone." See Lady Justice, supra note 12, at
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IV. PRACTICAL MATTERS
Beyond these broad philosophical considerations, there are
more mundane, though vital, practical considerations to the suc-
cessful use of telephone conferencing as a legal tool. Provision
must be made for adequate notice, so that stipulations or objec-
tions are known and dealt with, in case the court is willing to pro-
ceed over the objection.
Another fundamental practical consideration is who initiates
and pays for the call. Common sense would dictate that the mov-
ing party initiate and pay for the call. The problem arises in inte-
grating a 10:00 A.M. telephone hearing, for example, with a judge's
actual schedule, which may or may not run on time. Do the parties
wait on hold, or is the judge's current hearing to be interrupted?
Some judges have dealt with the problem by scheduling telephone
hearings only at certain times. 8 At least one judge prefers to have
the parties stand by at designated numbers with the court initiat-
ing collect calls."4
Once the hearing begins, maintaining order becomes even
more vital than usual. Because the nature of conference equipment
allows only one voice to be transmitted at a time, procedures must
allow only one person to speak at a time. The lack of visual identi-
fication dictates that the parties identify themselves prior to
speaking in order to protect the record. A scheduled order of argu-
ment or questioning could achieve the same end. The potential for
confusion is always present and may place practical limits on the
number of participants in such a hearing. A similar issue is how to
ensure that all documents referred to are before all parties prior to
the hearing. Better practice requires opposing counsel to forward
copies of all documents and cases to the court prior to the hearing.
If the testimony is taken, the problem of translation may arise.
Hearings involving translations are difficult enough even when
face-to-face. Experience shows that the problem is not insur-
mountable, 85 but this context does not seem ideally suited for tele-
phone hearings. Finally, one contemplating the use of telephone
hearings must consider the practicalities of the quality of the
transmission, the potential for accidental cut-off (and who has the
49.
83. FLORIDA JUDGES HANDBOOK, § 4.7 exhibits a,b,c (1981).
84. See Correspondence from Peggy Compiani to J. Allison DeFoor, II and enclosure,
Notice-Telephone Conferences Regarding Hearings (March 8, 1983)(available in the Uni-
versity of Miami Law Review office).
85. See Pilot Study, supra note 27, at 501-02.
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duty of restoring the connection), and even the availability of lines
into a busy courthouse switchboard. Nevertheless, experience in
actual practice reflects that such technical problems are rare.86
V. DRAWBACKS
All of the foregoing discussion has ignored the major objec-
tions to telephone hearings. The law has historically depended
upon face-to-face encounters for a variety of reasons. The United
States"8 and Florida8" constitutions each contain a right to con-
frontation, and the Florida Statutes9" and Florida Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure contain similar provisions. Whether these provi-
sions would prohibit an evidentiary hearing over the objections of
a party is an open question, turning ultimately on the meaning of
words like "appearance" and "confrontation" in an electronic age.
Many express a qualitative concern over the inability of the
listener, whether judge or counsel, to observe the speaker. This
would be particularly true of witnesses. What judge or counsel
would deny that he picks up insight from the body language of
opposing counsel in argument? The concern of some counsel has
been the inability to see the judge's reaction to the arguments
presented.92 The ability to evaluate a witness's demeanor is impor-
tant in factual problems. These problems suggest a limit to the
widespread use of telephone hearings involving evidentiary
matters.
An interesting counterpoint, however, to traditional assump-
tions in this area is recent research indicating that listeners are
better able to detect lying audibly only, as opposed to visually and
86. See Lady Justice, supra note 12, at 49.
87. "The classic model of litigation in American courts involves the resolution of cases
through proceedings in which the judge, counsel for the parties, and sometimes the parties
themselves and potential witnesses all are present in the courtroom." Lady Justice, supra
note 12, at 40. See also Telephone Hearings, supra note 14, at 408.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
89. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16. The same section contains a correlative right to be heard in
person, by counsel or both. Id. While no such wording appears in the federal Constitution,
the Supreme Court has held it to be implicit. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
90. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 90.801 (1983) (defines hearsay that is inadmissible except as pro-
vided by statute). FLA. STAT. § 90.802 (1983). Hearsay is generally inadmissible because it
denies the party against whom it is admitted the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
the person who made the original statement. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 1362 (1983).
91. Cf. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.180 (calling for the defendant to be "present," therefore as-
suring the ability to confront witnesses).
92. See supra note 80.
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audibly."3 Visual stimuli may, in fact, inhibit the ability to detect
lying. Of course, with the advent of technology that permits audio
and visual appearances, these objections may become moot.
Finally, there is an unspoken fear that anything but a dra-
matic courthouse occasion has a demeaning effect and otherwise
lessens the impact of any legal proceeding. But what damages the
system more, a state attorney attending depositions by telephone
while working in his office, or one who, as is so common today,
does not attend at all? Would telephone hearings of routine mat-
ters that eliminate charges for time wasted in transit, harm a sys-
tem in which a vast majority of our citizens cannot afford the ser-
vices of lawyers? Can we ignore so obvious an application of
technology and economy to our profession?
VI. FUTURE
The application of existing telephone technology to legal prac-
tice, particularly hearings and depositions, offers great potential
savings in judicial and legal time. But it is just the beginning. The
technology that allows audio/visual telephoning is already here9
and in use in selected cities. In Dade County, prisoners are
"brought before" a committing magistrate for a first appearance
via television, the prisoner sitting in one building and the judge in
another. Already, one state supreme court has found that the con-
frontation requirements of the United States Constitution does not
prohibit this type of "appearance" of a witness in a criminal case. 5
93. See California Experience, supra note 16; Haeberle, supra note 13, at nn. 68-69.
94. See Haeberle, supra note 13.
95. In Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975), the defendant was charged
with violation of a municipal ordinance proscribing the possession of marijuana. In what
clearly was intended as a test case, the chemist was allowed to testify from his office, ap-
pearing in court by means of an audio-visual hook-up. This was all done over the objections
of the defense. The McCoy Court found that this did not violate the confrontation clause of
the United States Constitution. Id. at 339. The court reasoned that the primary purpose of
the clause was the prevention of the evil of testimony by means of ex parte affidavits, and
that this evil was avoided by the audio-visual appearance of the witness, which allowed the
trier of fact to perceive his demeanor and the opposing counsel to examine him. Id. at 338-
39. The court relied on some interesting language in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965): "Our cases construing the [confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest se-
cured by it is the right of cross-examination; an adequate opportunity for cross-examination
may satisfy the clause even in the absence of physical confrontation." Id. at 418. The Mc-
Coy court went on to state:
We have the view that to require the physical presence of an expert witness
against one accused of violating a municipal police regulation would be to re-
quire more than the confrontation clause rights of an accused demand in many
instances of prosecutions for felonies. Today we have means of communication
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The application of such technology to the legal profession promises
a virtual revolution in the way trials and hearings are conducted. 6
VII. CONCLUSION
As the legal profession, and virtually all of American society,
weighs the cost effectiveness of telephone conferencing in the com-
ing years, there is no doubt that innovation will occur. The intro-
duction of technology is already restructuring American law offices.
This trend is manifesting itself in the judiciary by the increasing
use of telecommunication as a means of appearance in hearings
and depositions. The telephone hearing is most applicable to rou-
tine, non-evidentiary matters but has some use in more serious
matters. In the future, video capability in telephone communica-
tion may revolutionize the meaning of a court "appearance."
J. ALLISON DEFOOR, II*
ROBERT N. SECHEN**
not available only a few years ago. We can now by electronic means project the
image and voice of man clearly and distinctly at the speed of light and control
that means and ensure its integrity by closed circuit and monitors. While Dr.
Young was not physically present in the courtroom, his image and his voice were
there; they were there for the purpose of examination and cross-examination of
the witness as much so as if he were there in person; they were there for defen-
dant to see and hear and, by the same means, simultaneously for him to be seen
and heard by the witness; they were there for the trier of fact to see and here
and observe the demeanor of the witness as he sat miles, but much less than a
second, away responding to questions propounded by counsel.
McCoy, 525 S.W.2d at 339. Cf. Hutchins v. State, 286 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (prior
to the rule allowing videotaped depositions, a court-ordered videotaping of an unavailable
chemist testifying in a criminal prosecution did not deny that defendant the right to con-
front and cross-examine the witnesses against him, where the defendant was present at the
deposition and was given the right to cross-examine) (emphasis in original). Compare State
v. Brashire, 353 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1977) (use of deposition of victim unavailable due to death
from natural causes violated the criminal defendant's right of confrontation); with State v.
James, 402 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1981) (deposition of victim, unavailable for trial because of
death, not admissible at trial).
96. See generally Eliot, The Video Telephone in Criminal Justice: The Phoenix Pro-
ject, 55 U. DET. J. URB. L. 721 (1978); Gilmore, Arraignment by Television: A New Way to
Bring Defendants to the Courtroom, 63 JUDICATURE 396 (1980).
* Monroe County Judge, Sixteenth Judicial Circuit (the Florida Keys). Former Direc-
tor of the Narcotics Task force for the State Attorney and Assistant Public Defender, Six-
teenth Circuit; B.A., M.A., (Criminal Justice), University of South Florida; J.D., Stetson
University, College of Law. He has written several articles for the Florida Bar Journal, as
well as for the law reviews at Stetson University, the University of Houston, the .University
of Florida, and Nova University.
** Assistant City Attorney, City of Miami. B.S., University of South Florida; J.D., Uni-
versity of Miami School of Law. Currently Chairman of the Economics and Management of
the Law Practice Section of the Florida Bar. He has worked for eight years as Administra-
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tive Manager for various law firms and has also lectured extensively on the economics of the
practice of law to various bar associations and groups.
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Telephone Conferencing in Criminal Court
Cases*
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
As a response to the call for judicial efficiency, selected crimi-
nal trial courts of general jurisdiction were the sites for a research
project that explored telephone conferencing. 1 The research com-
ponent of the project, undertaken in conjunction with state and
local officials and the American Bar Association Action Commis-
sion to Reduce Court Costs and Delay and the Institute for Court
Management (ICM), 2 was designed to identify the conditions
under which telephone conferencing is feasible, and to gauge the
advantages and disadvantages of the procedure for the court, the
attorneys, and the defendants.
The idea for the pilot program grew out of related applications
of telephone conferencing in administrative fair hearings.3 Tele-
phone conferencing was proved an efficient alternative to in-person
proceedings that require hearing participants to travel considera-
ble distances. Moreover, the telephone conferencing proceedings
were as satisfactory as in-person proceedings for the various
participants.
* Research for this article was supported by a grant from the National Institute of
Justice (NIJ), U.S. Department of Justice (Grant No. 81-IJ-CX-0011). The views, analyses,
and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
policies of NIJ.
1. A telephone-conference court hearing is a three-way conversation between a judge
located in chambers and two attorneys located in their respective offices. The judge listens
to the attorneys through a speakerphone, which also facilitates the record being made by a
court reporter. Clients may be present with their attorneys, although in many instances they
do not participate in the hearing.
2. The ABA Action Commission is a sixteen member body established in 1979 for the
purpose of designing, implementing, evaluating, and disseminating new court procedures
that reduce the cost of litigation. Telephone conferencing is one of the Commission's project
areas with more complex programs aimed at reducing overall trial court delay, expediting
appellate cases, deterring discovery abuse, and activating state and local bar groups to initi-
ate their own cost and delay reduction programs. ICM is a private, nonprofit organization
located in Denver, Colorado. Established in 1970, ICM's main goal is to train judges, court
administrators, and lawyers in the tools of court management through a combined program
of training, research and technical assistance.
3. Corsi, The Use of Telephone Conferencing in Administrative Fair Hearings: Major
Findings of the New Mexico Experiment with Welfare Appeals, (1981) (available in Univer-
sity of Denver Law School library); Corsi, The Use of Telephone Conferencing in Adminis-
trative Fair Hearings: Major Findings of the New Mexico Experiment with Unemployment
Insurance Appeals, (1981) (available in University of Denver Law School Library).
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The success of the administrative fair hearings project led to
an exploratory study of the current use of telephone conferencing
in America's court systems, with a special focus on civil litigation.
Research uncovered a sporadic utilization pattern with individual
judges in selected jurisdictions conducting a variety of civil court
matters by telephone conferencing.4 Because there was virtually no
documentation of the effects of telephone conferencing in these ju-
risdictions, the Action Commission and the ICM designed a policy
research project to explore the range of suitable applications and
to answer many of the basic questions concerning the conse-
quences of telephone conferencing on the time, cost and quality of
court proceedings.
The Action Commission and the 1CM approached court offi-
cials and bar groups in Colorado and New Jersey with a plan to try
the new procedure in a variety of court settings. The proposal ini-
tially focused on the use of telephone conferencing in civil cases
with a primary emphasis on motion hearings. After preliminary re-
sults identified time savings for attorneys, cost savings to the liti-
gants, and no undue burdens for judges and court staff,5 the same
courts were asked to consider a parallel project in criminal cases.8
While the civil telephone conferencing project indicated the
acceptability of the procedures to judges and attorneys, uncer-
tainty existed regarding its use in the criminal arena. First, unlike
civil applications where the litigants frequently do not attend pre-
trial hearings, the criminal defendant has a right to be present at
all critical stages of the proceedings. Although this right may be
waived, the defendant's presence is making a factor that made
criminal telephone hearings more complicated than the three-way
conversations among judges and the two attorneys for civil
litigants.7
4. Hanson, Olson, Shuart, Thornton, Chapper & Mahoney, Telephone Conferencing in
Civil and Criminal Court Cases (Mar. 1984) (available at the National Institute of Justice,
Washington, D.C.).
5. Hanson, Olson, Shuart & Thornton, Telephone Hearings in Civil Trial Courts:
What Do Attorneys Think?, 66 JUDICATURE 408 (1983).
6. The criminal courts include Cumberland and Atlantic Counties in New Jersey, and
the Second, Twelfth, and Twentieth Judicial Districts in Colorado. The New Jersey sites
were, at the time of study, part of the Atlantic Vicinage which then consisted of the four
southernmost counties of that state. The Atlantic Vicinage has since been reorganized and
now includes only two of the counties. Denver is Colorado's Second Judicial District. The
Twelfth District, a six-county jurisdiction located in the southern part of the state, has two
principal courthouses in Alamosa and Del Norte. Boulder, a suburb of Denver, is the Twen-
tieth District.
7. Although there are numerous grounds on which the legality of telephone hearings in
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A second reason for questioning the efficiency of telephone
conferencing in criminal matters was that district attorneys and
public defenders generally had many hearings to handle each day.
As a result, their continuous presence at the courthouse raised the
issue whether they would save travel or waiting time by the use of
telephone conferencing.
Finally, attorneys and judges in criminal cases are sensitive to
both the seriousness of the charges brought against the defendant
and the possible sanctions that may be imposed. This sensitivity
makes judges and attorneys more cautious in designing operational
procedures and in selecting appropriate matters for telephone con-
ferencing in criminal cases than in civil cases.
Despite these meritorious concerns, evidence from the pilot
sites indicated that the new procedure worked well for a wide
range of matters and was advantageous to all of the participants.
The criminal court experiences corresponded to the previous civil
court results and led to the conclusion that telephone conferencing
was an idea whose time had come. Other courts which introduce
telephone conferencing systems will probably achieve the same
kind of positive results found in the pilot tests.
The purpose of this article is to highlight the essential findings
from the Colorado and New Jersey criminal court experiences.'
Section II describes the kinds of matters handled by telephone, the
conditions under which telephone hearings were held, and the
guidelines followed by the courts in conducting telephone confer-
ences. Section III reviews the reactions of the attorneys and judges
to the innovation. In Section IV, suggestions are made as to how
and why certain procedures commonly used in criminal trial courts
may have to be modified in order to achieve maximum benefits
from telephone conferencing.
courts and other public bodies may be challenged, litigation attacking the procedure in gen-
eral, or its application in specific cases, has been limited. A recent Virginia case challenged
the legality of the Roanoke School Board holding meetings by telephone conference. Roa-
noke City School Bd. v. Times-World Corp., 226 Va. 185, 307 S.E.2d 256 (1983). Plaintiffs
argued that such a practice violated the state's Freedom of Information Act. The Virginia
Supreme Court, however, ruled that the Act does not ban telephone conferences, and, that if
the state legislature intended the Act to apply to telephone conferencing, it would be neces-
sary to amend the statute. Sherwood, Information Act Does Not Bar Teleconferences, Va.
Court Says, Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
8. A more complete description of the background of both the civil and criminal court
projects is available elsewhere. See Hanson, Evaluation of Telephone Conferencing in Civil
and Criminal Cases (1983) (available at the Institute for Court Management, Denver, Colo.).
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II. NATURE OF TELEPHONE HEARINGS AND PROCEDURES
Prior to the pilot project, selected courts used telephone con-
ferencing in criminal cases." Telephone conferencing occurred on a
regular basis in pretrial conferences (Lakewood Colorado Munici-
pal Court), motion hearings (United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York and New Mexico Court of Appeal),
and obtaining testimony from witnesses unable to come to court
(Los Angeles Municipal Court). In each of these jurisdictions,
judges, through meetings with the prosecutor and the public de-
fender, usually made a determination as to those matters that were
potentially appropriate for telephone hearings. The court then
drew up preliminary guidelines for scheduling, arranging, and con-
ducting telephone hearings. The court distributed notices of the
pilot project, a tentative list of matters, and procedural guidelines
to the attorneys through bar association newsletters, and docu-
ments made available in the individual courtrooms.
In criminal telephone hearings, as in in-person criminal hear-
ings, defendants did not always participate either because their
presence was not required for a particular hearing or because they
waived their right to be present. In other cases, defendants on
bond participated with their attorneys by telephone from their at-
torneys' offices, and incarcerated or hospitalized defendants also
appeared by telephone. Rarely did an attorney participate in a
telephone hearing without his client's consent.
Because of the willingness of the judges and the attorneys to
propose telephone hearings, the range of matters that proved suit-
able for telephone hearings was extensive. The criminal court busi-
ness that was handled included substantive, procedural, and dis-
covery-related matters. The matters heard by telephone
conferencing at various stages of the criminal process, included (in
order of their frequency): municipal court appeals; entry of pleas;
sentencing; motions (e.g., discovery-related motions, motion to ex-
punge prior criminal record, motion to sequester a jury, motion to
continue a jury trial); show cause hearings on bond forfeiture;
questions from a jury; bail review hearings; witness testimony; and
miscellaneous (e.g., issuance of a court order, filing of government
papers, discussion of amended statute, disposition hearing, habeas
corpus return).
Although telephone conferencing was regularly used in these
areas, it often was not used exclusively in handling a particular
9. See supra note 4.
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type of criminal matter. An exception was municipal court appeals
in New Jersey, where it was the presumed mode. In most in-
stances, these hearings involved a private defense counsel and a
defendant on bond. Telephone conferencing created time savings
because defense counsel were generally located at a distance from
the courthouse, and the defendant avoided both travel and waiting
time. Although these factors may have made the telephone hear-
ings in these instances desirable, there were additional factors that
contributed to their regular use. For example, municipal court ap-
peals are based on the lower court record and involve neither new
evidence nor testimony from the defendant. Thus, telephone con-
ferencing seemed reasonable to the defendants.
Telephone hearings were prearranged or handled spontane-
ously as situations arose. Telephone conferencing .was used in crim-
inal cases in the following specific instances:
1. One judge, unable to appear in court because of illness, con-
ducted her entire day's schedule of miscellaneous matters by
telephone from her home. The prosecutor, defense attorneys,
and defendants, who were scheduled to appear in court that day,
participated in the hearings from the judge's chambers by
speakerphone.
2. A telephone hearing was conducted in which a defendant ap-
peared by telephone from his bed at the state hospital.
3. A statement was given over the telephone by a defendant who
was incarcerated in an out-of-state federal detention center.
This eliminated the necessity and potential risks involved in
transporting the defendant under guard.
4. Testimony was taken by telephone from a nurse in a hearing
on defendant's motion for a new trial. The defendant, public de-
fender, and district attorney were present in the judge's cham-
bers. The nurse underwent examination and cross-examination
during the forty-minute hearing. This proved to be a substantial
saving of the witness's time.
More generally, telephone conferencing of criminal matters
has proven a suitable alternative to in-person hearings in various
circumstances. Hearings involving out-of-town lawyers, who would
have to travel a considerable distance to appear in court, took
place by phone. Routine or uncomplicated matters where there was
no compelling reason for the lawyers to come to the courthouse
were particularly appropriate for telephone conferencing. Although
travel may not be an essential consideration here, the judge or law-
yers may simply prefer to dispose of the matter by telephone.
Emergency situations, where a matter must be resolved quickly,
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and where it would be difficult for the atcorneys to get to the
courthouse on short notice, were handled rapidly and efficiently.
Moreover, given the proximity of the district attorney to the
courthouse, telephone hearings are useful in "split-hearings,"
where one attorney is at the courthouse and appears in person,
while the other appears by telephone. Although the split-hearing is
not a telephone conference call involving parties at three (or more)
locations, this application of the telephone serves to reduce travel
and waiting time for defense counsel.
Telephone conferencing was successful largely because of the
use of procedures to ensure the same degree of judicial control, or-
der, and decorum as existed in in-person hearings. Despite the
simplicity of the telephone conference calls, judges and court staff
are required to perform certain new administrative functions.
These include selecting a location for the telephone hearing and
setting up the conference call.
Although some telephone hearings were conducted in the
courtroom, the majority took place in the judge's chambers. Coor-
dination for a particular telephone hearing between the judge and
the staff (e.g., court reporter, division or court clerk) was similar to
the coordination required for an in-court hearing. If the hearing
was to be a matter of record, a court reporter was present, or, if
accessible, audio-recording equipment was used to record the
proceeding.
Additionally, the responsibility for initiating and setting up
the telephone hearing usually rested with a staff member or a
judge. Court initiation, rather than attorney initiation of the con-
ference, allowed more judicial control over the timing of the hear-
ing and eliminated the necessity of routing the call through a tele-
phone company conference operator where the attorney's offices
were not equipped with telephone conferencing equipment. Mak-
ing the court the call-initiator, however, clearly placed more de-
mands on the court staff members.
Another consideration in determining where the conference
call was to originate was whether the court had access to a WATS
line. This arrangement enabled the courts in New Jersey to absorb
more easily the operating costs associated with long-distance tele-
phone calls. Even where courts do not have access to WATS lines,
long-distance toll charges should not be an impediment because
the call can be court-initiated and the charges reversed to one or
both parties.
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III. JUDICIAL AND ATTORNEY REACTION
A. Judges' Reactions
The willingness of the bench to use telephone conferencing
should not be automatically assumed. The most direct beneficiaries
of the procedure are the attorneys who save travel and waiting
time. The effect of telephone conferencing on the quality of the
hearing is an important consideration to the bench and the bar,
especially in criminal matters where individual liberty is at stake.
Few judges are likely to sacrifice the quality of a hearing simply to
save attorneys travel time.
Personal interviews were conducted with participating judges
in order to study their views on the use of telephone conferencing
for criminal matters. The extent to which the judges used tele-
phone conferencing correlated with their views on the utility of the
new procedure. Those who used it most frequently tended to have
more positive views, while those who used it less found that it of-
fered fewer advantages to the court, attorneys, and defendants,
and that it was a potential source of problems in resolving cases.
Greater use may contribute to more positive views, but frequency
of use depends on a commitment by judges and courtroom staff to
examine pending dockets and carefully isolate likely candidates for
telephone hearings. In the courtrooms where telephone conferenc-
ing was used most extensively, the innovation gradually became
part of the court's case management tools.
Among the advantages that the judges noted was the greater
operational efficiency of the court, especially in scheduling flex-
ibility and in time savings. The scheduling flexibility meant conve-
nience in rescheduling hearings. Matters handled by telephone
were generally scheduled on the same days that they would have
been scheduled for in-court hearings. The judges found that they
were able to reschedule these hearings if they or counsel were not
available at the prearranged time. Instead of having to reset the
matter for the next regularly-scheduled date, the matter could be
heard by telephone within a day or two.
The judges also described the time savings that arose from an
increased capacity to resolve matters without having to wait for all
of the attorneys to arrive at the courthouse. Telephone conferenc-
ing enabled the judges to make decisions at the time that a request
for a hearing was made, and thus to avoid clogging the calendar
with additional matters for future hearing dates.
Another notable benefit to the court is that telephone hearings
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do not seem to last as long as in-person hearings. There are several
factors that may explain this. One factor, according to the judges,
is that interruptions among the attorneys for both sides are less
common during telephone hearings than during in-person hearings.
In addition, judges believe that attorneys appearing by telephone
tend to deliver shorter and more concise presentations of the legal
issues than when appearing in court. Finally, because in-court pro-
ceedings may serve as a "social" gathering for lawyers and judges,
they often extend beyond the actual content of the hearing itself.
Dialogue during a telephone hearing tends to be limited to the
matter at hand. The judges who used telephone conferences most
extensively did not see any disadvantage to the court, counsel, or
defendants. They felt comfortable with the new procedure and did
not view the use of the telephone as making any difference in the
quality of the hearing.
Another group of criminal court judges used the telephone
conferencing procedure on a more limited basis. These judges
would suggest a telephone hearing in certain instances, for exam-
ple, if the hearing involved considerable travel for one or more of
the participants. The reason for this may be twofold. First, these
judges early in the project expressed some reluctance in conducting
criminal telephone hearings because they believed that the proce-
dure might actually lengthen the disposition of cases. The judges
believed that because the district attorney and defense counsel
would not have the same opportunity to discuss issues on the tele-
phone as they would during a recess at court, the chances for early
disposal of the case would decrease. Second, these judges handled
relatively few criminal cases, and efficiency in the court was simply
not a primary motivation for handling matters by telephone. In-
court hearings give both the judge and the attorneys an opportu-
nity to discuss informally the status of other cases.
With reference to the quality of the hearings, all of the judges
were asked to compare telephone hearings to the traditional in-
person hearings on the basis of: the judge's understanding of the
issues, the judge's ability to control a telephone hearing, the
judge's ability to ask questions, counsel's ability to present an ef-
fective argument, and counsel's ability to answer questions. Most
agreed that telephone conferencing did not change the proceedings
for better or for worse. The judges unanimously agreed that tele-
phone hearings did not alter their understanding of the issues per-
tinent to the hearing. Furthermore, they overwhelmingly agreed
that their ability to ask questions during a telephone hearing was
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the same as for in-person hearings. Although there appears to be
somewhat less of a consensus, a plurality of the judges believed
that their control over a telephone hearing, counsel's ability to an-
swer questions, and counsel's preparation efforts are the same
when compared to an in-court hearing.
Finally, in looking at the impact on the defendants, the judges
indicated that telephone hearings did not sacrifice the rights or in-
terests of criminal defendants. Again, the judges who used tele-
phone conferencing saw several positive effects and few, if any,
negative consequences. The benefits cited include the potential
financial savings in the form of lower fees to clients and the possi-
bility of defendants losing less time from work because of the more
certain time schedule for telephone hearings.
B. Attorneys' Reactions
At the beginning of the project, several attorneys expressed
reservations about the desirability of telephone hearings. Some at-
torneys offered arguments against all possible applications of tele-
phone conferencing. As an illustration, members of one public de-
fender's office stated that there would be no gain to them by
conducting telephone hearings when the defendants are in custody,
and there would even be a loss in time or a weakening in relation-
ships with their clients. If a public defender traveled to the jail in
order to be with his client during a telephone hearing, this would
require more time than is normally required to walk to the court-
house. On the other hand, if the attorney was not with his client,
and the defendant "appeared" by telephone from the jail and the
attorney "appeared" by telephone from his office, this might di-
minish the importance of the hearing for the client, lessen the at-
torney's control over his client, or make the hearing too impersonal
for the defendant.
These same attorneys had arguments against telephone hear-
ings for their clients on bond. Although they admitted that a tele-
phone hearing might mean that their clients would lose less time
from work by traveling to the law office instead of the courthouse,
and that it also might be more convenient than an in-court hearing
because of less waiting time, the attorneys nevertheless objected to
telephone hearings for clients who were free on bond. They said
that if the defendant were at the attorney's office, the defendant
would want to discuss the case after the hearing was concluded.
This additional time spent with the client was viewed as a burden
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and a valid reason for not using the new procedure."
Interestingly, after the procedure was implemented some of
the attorneys who were initially skeptical joined the vast majority
who were satisfied with the new procedure. Structured interviews
were conducted with attorneys on a variety of topics, including
their degree of satisfaction, the factors associated with satisfaction,
the effects on criminal defendants, and the time and cost savings.
The results of the interviews are summarized below.
1. SATISFACTION
Most of the attorneys were satisfied with the way that tele-
phone hearings were conducted and saw little difference between
in-person and telephone hearings. Of the prosecutors, public de-
fenders, and private attorneys interviewed, ninety percent (83/92)
were either "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" with the
procedure."
Based on civil court research, 2 we expected that three attitu-
dinal variables would predict satisfaction. They include the attor-
neys' views on (1) the ability to make an effective oral argument;
(2) the ability to answer the judge's questions; and (3) the judge's
understanding of the issues. If telephone hearings allowed attor-
neys to present arguments adequately on these three dimensions,
they were likely to be satisfied with the procedure.
Attorneys in both Colorado and New Jersey were likely to
view telephone conferencing positively if they believed that the
procedure allowed them to present an effective oral argument. At-
torneys in New Jersey, moreover, were likely to be satisfied with
the hearing if they felt that the judge was just as able to under-
stand the issues in a telephone hearing as in an in-person hearing.
Finally, the ability to answer the judge's questions in a telephone
10. Although the illustrations describing situations in which attorneys were skeptical of
telephone conferencing refer to institutional attorneys, we encountered several situations in
which district attorneys and public defenders were the leading proponents of telephone
hearings. In Colorado's Twelfth Judicial District; covering six large counties, the district
attorney and the public defender saw advantages both to their offices and to their clients.
By avoiding two hours of travel time, they were able to work on other matters and allow
investigators to use the offices' automobiles. Similarly, the use of telephone conferencing for
motion hearings in the New Mexico Court of Appeal arose at the request of district attor-
neys who represent the state in criminal appeals. Because New Mexico is the fifth largest
state, the travel savings are considerable.
11. The interview included both open-ended and close-ended questions. The closed-
ended questions were generally Likert-scale items with possible answers ranging from "very
satisfied" or "strongly agree" to "very dissatisfied" or "strongly disagree."
12. See supra note 4.
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hearing was found to be a predictor of satisfaction in Colorado.
Factors That Predict Attorney Satisfaction





Oral Argument .47 .70
Ability to
Answer the





When hearings were conducted by telephone, attorneys saved
both travel and waiting time. The round trip travel time was ap-
proximately one hour in both states. However, the time saved va-
ried from court to court and state to state. For example, the aver-
age travel time saved in Colorado's Twelfth District was four
hours,14 while the average time saved in the Second District (Den-
ver) was one hour. Additionally, the travel time is augmented by
avoided waiting time at the courthouse; waiting time was reduced
an average of one-half hour in Colorado and nearly an hour in New
Jersey. This savings is important because the attorneys indicated
that most of the in-court waiting time is spent unproductively. The
amount of travel and waiting time saved by institutional attorneys
takes on an added dimension when these particular savings are
viewed in terms of increased efficiency and the corresponding po-
tential for saving tax dollars.
13. The numbers in this table are correlation coefficients. A rule of thumb in interpret-
ing these numbers is that 1.0 to .6 indicates a strong relationship, .59 to .3 indicates a mod-
erate relationship, and .29 to .0 indicates a weak relationship.
14. The Twelfth District is a large rural district characterized by mountainous terrain.
Therefore, an average four-hour savings time is not unusual for out-of-district attorneys.
Even many local attorneys could save 100 miles of travel by automobile.
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3. EFFECTS OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCING ON DEFENDANTS
Although criminal attorneys may appreciate the opportunity
to save time and believe that telephone hearings are properly con-
ducted, they may nevertheless have reservations about telephone
conferencing because of its effects on their clients. Our discussions
with private counsel and public defenders prior to implementation
of the pilot programs revealed several potential problems, includ-
ing the impersonal nature of a telephone hearing, the lack of op-
portunity to discuss matters with a client in custody, and the
weakening of an already fragile relationship between counsel and
client. After introduction of telephone conferencing, however, at-
torneys handling criminal matters by telephone saw a greater num-
ber of advantages than disadvantages to their clients. The repre-
sentative role of the attorney seemed to make a difference in the
types of advantages and disadvantages that the attorney saw. For
example, the public defenders saw fewer tangible savings (such as
less time and travel) for their clients than did private lawyers.
Overall, public defenders saw fewer benefits than did district attor-
neys and private attorneys. In citing disadvantages, public defend-
ers expressed concern with telephone hearings' effects on their rap-
port with clients and on the defendants' constitutional rights.
4. COST SAVINGS
The cost savings to criminal defendants was not an automatic
translation of private counsel's time savings to a proportionate re-
duction in fees charged. 15 Numerous factors prevent a perfect
translation. The highest hurdle was the lawyer's fee structure.
Fixed fees were less likely to be adjusted than hourly fees because
of reduced time. Nevertheless, when court proceedings were han-
dled by telephone, thirty-eight percent of the Colorado private at-
torneys and seventy-five percent of the New Jersey private attor-
neys responded that they did pass on cost savings to their clients.
In those instances where the attorneys charged lower fees, the av-
erage savings was nearly $400 in Colorado and $130 in New
Jersey.16
15. The issue of cost savings to criminal defendants is relevant only in cases involving
private counsel. The time savings that district attorneys and public defenders realize, how-
ever, contributes to greater efficiency, which is beneficial to taxpayers.
16. The larger savings in Colorado are attributed to the extraordinary savings accruing
to defendants in the Twelfth District who were represented by counsel from Denver. If the
Twelfth District cases are excluded, the average savings in Colorado are much closer to that
for New Jersey.
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IV. ATTAINING REGULAR USE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCING
Telephone conferencing may be limited to a case-by-case basis
at the request of attorneys or at the suggestion of a judge. On the
other hand, regular usage maximizes the benefits that accrue to
judges, attorneys, and defendants. Unlike civil proceedings, crimi-
nal court proceedings often involve a core group of "ac-
tors"-prosecutors, public defenders, retained counsel-who are
scheduled to be at the courthouse throughout the week, making
telephone hearings appear to offer little benefit. Prosecutors' of-
fices are generally located very near to, or within, the courthouse.
In addition, where a large proportion of defense work is handled
by a public defender's office, the workload often requires public
defenders to be in court on a daily basis. The need to be in court
so frequently is also the result of a court's scheduling practices.
Criminal hearings are scheduled throughout the week, often with
no particular day set aside for certain types of matters.
If telephone conferencing is to be used on a regular basis, ad-
vance planning is essential. For example, scheduling only matters
suitable for telephone conferencing on a specific day may permit a
public defender or prosecutor to avoid travel to the courthouse for
other in-court matters. This type of scheduling was adopted in
Cumberland County, New Jersey. The crucial factor there was the
court's familiarity with the institutional office's practices and with
those of the private bar. The ability and willingness of the judge
and the calendaring clerk to rearrange their own sequences and
methods of handling matters enabled telephone hearings to be-
come a viable alternative to in-court hearings.
There was minimal change in the scheduling habits of the Col-
orado courts after telephone hearings were implemented there;
judges and staff members did not alter their regular docketing pro-
cedures. A rearrangement of the court's docketing systems, how-
ever, may have produced time slots convenient for both prosecu-
tors and public defenders to remain in their offices and conduct
pending business by telephone. For example, if matters necessitat-
ing in-court appearance could be set on particular days, this would
create a greater opportunity for the judge and staff to conduct
matters by telephone on other days when it might be convenient
for the attorneys to remain in their offices. It should be recognized
that this may be difficult to arrange, especially in a smaller-sized
court and bar. Regardless of size, however, the administrative ef-
fort requires constant communication between the judge and other
staff members and the prosecutors, public defenders, and private
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counsel.
V. CONCLUSION
Research studies over the past several years have questioned
commonly accepted practices in law enforcement, adjudication,
and corrections. Additionally, evaluation reports consistently con-
clude that reforms fail to be effective and efficient substitutes for
existing programs. Consequently, a common lament among policy-
makers is that systematic analyses tend to point out the programs
that do not work instead of the ones that do. The telephone hear-
ing projects in Colorado and New Jersey offer a counter-example
to this trend.
The project's primary focus on pretrial criminal matters raises
the issue of its extension to other areas. For example, telephone
conferencing has been considered for handling post-trial motions
by inmates of state penal institutions. Telephone conferencing
eliminates the security problems involved in transporting prisoners
to court.
Thus, telephone conferencing is an incremental but important
change that courts can introduce to benefit attorneys and defen-
dants without imposing significant costs on the court or compro-
mising the quality of justice. Although careful planning is neces-
sary to integrate the innovation into existing procedures and
practices, telephone conferencing in criminal cases is a viable op-
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The history of the interpretation of the fourth amendment1 is
long and complex. Numerous books, scholarly articles, and judicial
expositions have attempted to trace and to clarify its various con-
structions, uses, and abuses.2 This article will examine the interre-
lationship between the law of search and seizure and modern elec-
tronic communications.3
Every state has a statutory provision governing the issuance of
search warrants.4 Generally, these statutes, together with the case
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall is-
sue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983); J. HIRSCHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS (1979); Israel, Legislative Regulation of Search and Seizures: The Michigan Pro-
posals, 73 MICH. L. REV. 221, 258-62 (1974); Nakell, Proposed Revisions of North Carolina's
Search and Seizure Law, 52 N.C. L. REV. 277, 306-11 (1973); Comment, Oral Search War-
rants: A New Standard of Warrant Availability, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 691 (1973); Note,
Telephonic Search Warrants: A Proposal, 2 CRIM. JUST. Q. 151 (1974).
3. For an examination of the encroachment of modern communications upon individu-
als' privacy, see generally J. WICKLEIN, ELECTRONIC NIGHTMARE: THE NEW COMMUNICATIONS
AND FREEDOM (1981), and M. COHEN, N. RONEY & J. STEPAN, LAW & SCIENCE: A SELECTED
BIBLIOGRAPHY (1980).
4. ALA. CODE 1 15-15-4 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.010 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-3914 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-205 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526 (Deering 1982);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-303 (1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-33a(c); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 §
2306 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-522 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 933.03 (West 1973); GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-303 [17-5-21] (1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 803-33 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 19-
4403 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 S. 108-3 (Smith-Hurd 1970); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-5-2
(Burns 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 808.3 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2502 (1981); Ky.
R. CRIM. P. 13.10; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 162 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 55 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551 (Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 276, § 1 (West Supp. 1983-1984); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 1259 (1) (Callaghan 1978); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 626.08 (West 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 542.27(6)(2)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-202 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 29-814.03 (Supp. 1982); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 179.045 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 595-A:4 (1974); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 7; N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 690.36(1)-(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-244
(1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.23 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1223 (West
1958); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1223.1 (West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.545(4)
(1983); PA. R. CRIM. P. 2003(a); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-5-3 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-1-40
(Law Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-35-5 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-6-
103 (1982); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 18.01(b) (Vernon 1977 Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
23-4(2) (1982); VT. R. CRIM. P. 41(c); VA. CODE § 19.2-54 (1983); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R.
2.3(c); WASH. J. CT. CRIM. R. 2.10(c); W. VA. CODE § 62-1A-3 (1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
968.12(1) (West 1971 & Supp. 1983-1984); Wvo. R. CRIM. P. 40(c).
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law, require an independent magistrate to rule on probable cause
based on the totality of the circumstances.5 For a magistrate to
issue a search warrant, affidavits and other information must con-
vince him that probable cause exists in order to authorize the
search. "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assess-
ment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."' The totality of
circumstances test allows the magistrate to balance all relevant in-
formation presented to him.
Occasionally, searches are permitted without the benefit of a
judge's or magistrate's determination of probable cause.7 One ex-
ample is when there is not enough time to obtain a warrant. It is
fair to say, as the Supreme Court did in Chimel v. California,' that
law-enforcement officers who believe that they have probable cause
may wait briefly at a location until another officer returns with a
signed warrant. It is, however, unfair to bring the wheels of justice
to a grinding halt for several hours while an officer attempts to
locate a judge or magistrate.'
Our challenge is to bring criminal justice procedures up-to-
date with current technology. Reducing the delay between request-
ing a search warrant and receiving an authorization was the chief
reason that California in 19701° and Arizona in 197111 enacted leg-
islation that permits telephonic search warrants. Although several
other states issue warrants over the phone, 2 this article will focus
5. This test is set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1984).
6. Id. at 2328.
7. Generally, the Supreme Court follows a per se exclusionary rule, holding that war-
rantless searches are automatically unreasonable in the absence of those limited circum-
stances that justify governmental intrusion. This rule was most clearly articulated in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where the court declared that "[slearches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unrea-
sonable-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Id.
at 357. The following cases illustrate some of the circumstances that permit warrantless
searches: South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (routine automobile inventory
searches); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border searches); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311
(1972) (certain administrative searches); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (mis-
placed trust); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (incidental to a lawful arrest); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ("stop and frisk"); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot
pursuit); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (an emergency); Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (abandoned property).
8. 395 U.S. 752.
9. Id.
10. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1523-1542 (West 1982).
11. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3914 (1978).
12. Several other states have also authorized telephonic warrants. See, e.g., MONT.
[Vol. 38:625
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE COURTROOM
first upon the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in relation to
telephonic search warrants, and then upon the several controver-
sial issues involved with their use.
II. TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANTS: A CONCESSION TO MODERN
TECHNOLOGY BY THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
In 1977, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
was amended to allow for the issuance of a warrant under certain
circumstances "based upon sworn and oral testimony communi-
cated by telephone or other appropriate means."13 The basic re-
quirements that must be met under this provision are outlined
below.
The warrant must be requested by a "federal law enforcement
officer or an attorney for the government."' 4 In this respect, there
is no difference between telephonic search warrants and federal
search warrants. Although a strict interpretation of this rule might
seem to preclude a state officer from obtaining a federal warrant,
as a practical matter a federal warrant may be obtained by a state
officer so long as he coordinates the request with either a federal
agent or government attorney. Thus, in United States v. John-
son,15 a telephonic warrant was upheld where a city police officer
supplied an oral affidavit, but where an Assistant United States
Attorney initiated contact with the magistrate, who then tele-
phoned the police officer.
Application for a search warrant must be made to a federal
magistrate. 6 This differs from the provisions applicable to war-
rants supported by a written affidavit, which authorize either a
federal magistrate or a judge of a state court of record within the
district where the property is located to issue federal warrants. 7
The rationale for this difference is that federal magistrates should
be easily accessible over the telephone. Yet, in the interest of pro-
moting the issuance of search warrants, and hence reducing war-
rantless searches, it may become necessary to authorize state
CODE. ANN. 1146-5-202 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-814.03 (Supp. 1982); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 690.36 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.545(4) (1983); S.D. Coni-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-35-5 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-4(2) (1982); WASH. SUPER. CT.
CraM. R. 2.3(c) (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.12(1) (West 1971 & Supp. 1983-1984).
13. FED. R. CRiM. P. 41(a)(c)(2)(A).
14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (a).
15. 641 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1981).
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A).
17. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a).
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judges to issue telephonic warrants.
The warrant itself, as opposed to the affidavit, must be in
written form.18 The applicant must prepare a document called a
"duplicate original" warrant and read it verbatim to the magis-
trate, who enters the information verbatim on a document to be
known as the "original warrant." The magistrate may direct the
applicant to sign the magistrate's name on the duplicate original
while he, in turn, signs the original warrant and enters on the face
of the original the exact time of its issuance.1 "
The Rule contemplates the preparation of the duplicate origi-
nal warrant in advance of the call to the magistrate. As long as the
duplicate warrant executed by the agent conforms in all material
respects to the original warrant in the possession of the magistrate,
it appears that any procedural error in the timing of the prepara-
tion of the duplicate original will be deemed harmless by the
courts.20
In addition to finding probable cause to support the issuance
of a telephonic warrant, the magistrate must be satisfied that the
circumstances make it reasonable to dispense with the preferred
written affidavit.21 The magistrate's finding in this regard is not
reviewable absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the
applicant.22
The oral testimony in support of the warrant must be sworn
and recorded.2 3 The oath should be administered by the magistrate
in advance of the recitation of the testimony. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit has held that the failure to administer
the oath prior to the taking of the testimony invalidates any re-
sulting warrant, notwithstanding the subsequent giving of the oath
in the telephonic proceeding in a manner that relates back to the
earlier testimony.24 But this decision is illogical and hypertechni-
cal. Written affidavits are invariably prepared by the affiant and
read by the magistrate before an oath is administered. Moreover,
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1)(B).
19. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1)(C).
20. United States v. Shorter, 600 F.2d 585, 587 (6th Cir. 1979) (search valid even where
agent failed to fill out "duplicate original warrant" before calling the magistrate where there
was no bad faith shown; but search invalid where oath was not administered in advance of
the agent's testimony).
21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(C).
22. See Johnson, 641 F.2d 652, 658; Shorter, 600 F.2d 585, 587.
23. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(D) (recording must be by writing or by mechanical
device).
24. Shorter, 600 F.2d at 588.
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the court's rationale suggests that the congressional purpose of im-
pressing upon the telephone caller "the solemnity of the proceed-
ing in spite of the lack of formal appearance before a court"2 a can
only be fulfilled by administering the oath in advance of the testi-
mony. The court overemphasizes the significance of the timing and
mandates exceeding ritualistic results. There is no reason to be-
lieve that a contemporaneous oath incorporating that which has
been previously stated makes any less of an impression on an affi-
ant than an oath verifying that which has yet to be said. Where an
error in timing is made regarding the administering of the oath,
there is no substantial distinction between asking an affiant if he
swears to the truth of his previous statement and asking him to
repeat verbatim those previous statements. When the magistrate
fails to administer the oath immediately, and the error is discov-
ered, a truly literal interpretation of the statute would mandate
that the call be terminated and placed again. The Ninth Circuit,
by a better analysis, reached the opposite conclusion and held that
an oath administered at the conclusion of the affiant's testimony
"constitutes non-fundamental noncompliance with Rule 41 and
does not require suppression. '2 6 The court reasoned that no
prejudice resulted from the timing of the oath in that the testi-
mony would have been substantially identical had the oath been
administered in advance.
In addition to administering the oath properly, the magistrate
must record all of the call after being informed that the purpose of
the call is to request a warrant. A tape recording is the preferred
method, but in its absence a stenographic or longhand verbatim
record will suffice. If a tape recording or stenographic record is
made, the magistrate must have it transcribed and certified as ac-
curate. The transcription and a copy of the original record must
then be filed with the court.2"
III. TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANTS: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS
The telephonic search warrant represents a technological ad-
vancement that can bring law enforcement up to date with other
uses of telecommunications. When used properly, a telephonic
search warrant enables law enforcement officers to receive prompt
and prior judicial approval of searches. This should minimize the
25. Id.
26. Johnson, 641 F.2d at 657-58.
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(D).
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threat of exclusion of evidence as a result of pre-trial motions, as
well as ensure the maximum protection of fourth amendment
rights. A great deal of the potential benefit of telephonic search
warrants remains unrealized because states have chosen to prohibit
their use. This section will delineate several issues that may be
raised concerning the acquisition and use of telephonic search war-
rants. Little in this area of the law is clear-cut. But because the
prospects for the use of telephonic search warrants outweigh the
problems, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals 28 has suggested that state legislatures should
follow the lead of California, Arizona, and the United States Con-
gress in passing legislation permitting the use of telephonic search
warrants.
A. Recording the Conversation
The issuance of a telephonic warrant in some jurisdictions is
contingent upon the availability of a recording device at the magis-
trate's home or office.29 Other jurisdictions allow for a longhand
verbatim or stenographic record to be made by the magistrate.30
Few magistrates know shorthand, however, and no judicial officer
is going to react very graciously to a request at 3:00 a.m. to take
pen and paper in hand and take dictation for the next hour or so.
Thus, a tape recorder or telephone answering machine, coupled
with a willing magistrate, is probably necessary if such warrants
are to be issued. An applicant for a telephone search warrant
should himself, if possible, record the call in its entirety. Although
Rule 41(c)(2)(D) specifies that the magistrate is to make the re-
cording, mechanical devices have been known to fail, and it is un-
fortunately all too easy for tapes to be accidentally erased. Where
the magistrate accidentally records over the affidavit upon which
the prosecution's entire case rests, a secondary recording would
probably be admissible to save the warrant.3
28. Report on Police 95 (1973).
29. E.g., ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3914 (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-202 (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29.-814.03 (Supp. 1982); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. §§ 690.36(1)-(2) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1983-1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-4(2) (1982); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R.
2.3(c) (West 1980).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526 (Deering 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.545(4) (1983).
31. This result would be in accord with Johnson, 641 F.2d 652. The court there held
that "non-fundamental non-compliance" with Rule 41 required suppression only where
prejudice could be demonstrated or where the non-compliance was deliberate. See also
United States v. Lloyd, 721 F.2d 331 (11th Cir. 1983). Furthermore, because many jurisdic-
tions make use of form warrants, it may be possible for officers and judges to use forms that,
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B. Warrants Based on an Informant
The four corners of an application for a warrant, whether writ-
ten or oral must convince a neutral magistrate that probable cause
exists. Generally, a magistrate should issue warrants according to a
single standard. Several questions arise, however, when the issu-
ance of a warrant requested over the phone is based on an inform-
ant's testimony. Questions may surface relating to the veracity or
reliability of the informant's report. For example, it may be neces-
sary for the police, who know the informant, to satisfy the magis-
trate that there is a substantial basis for believing the informant.2
Will this differ from person-to-person conversation? Similarly,
when a judge is confronted by only the voice of an officer,33 what
will be necessary to convince the judge of the value to place on the
informant's tip?34
In the presence of a judge, an officer may be able to use forms
of non-verbal communication and persuasion unavailable on the
telephone. 35 For example, if an officer must explain the informant's
basis of knowledge, or the particular means by which he came by
certain information, visual signals and cues may be important in
convincing a judge of probable cause.
Unlike a written application for a warrant, which is judged
solely on its merits as stated, an oral application can be changed to
serve the desires of the magistrates. As Heisse notes, "[iun the
event the magistrate does not find sufficient probable cause in the
officer's statement, he may question the officer until satisfied that
probable cause does, indeed, exist. '36 It would be difficult to ap-
peal the legality of such a warrant, even if it took several attempts
for the magistrate to issue it. 7
when approved, could serve as duplicate originals.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
33. Comment, Oral Search Warrants, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 691 (1972).
34. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corrobo-
ration and Probable Cause, 20 AM. CR. L.R. 99 (1982).
35. See generally M. KNAPP, NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION IN HUMAN INTERACTION
(1978).
36. Heisse, Warrantless Automobile Searches and Telephonic Search Warrants, 7
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1031, 1036 (1980).
37. It would be difficult to appeal the legality of such a warrant, even if it took several
attempts for the magistrate to issue it. In some circumstances, it may be necessary for the
officer to break the connection and call the judge again. This would constitute a new appli-
cation rather than an amended attempt.
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C. Warrantless Searches
A significant legal issue that promises to emerge from tele-
phonic warrant procedure is the extent to which warrantless
searches will continue to be justified in light of exigent circum-
stances, if a telephonic warrant is reasonably available. The
amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant by traditional means
has always been considered in determining whether circumstances
are exigent.3 8 Specifically, in the area where search warrants are
not generally required, the search of motor vehicles,39 the availabil-
ity of a telephonic warrant may limit the exigent circumstances ex-
ception and require the issuance of a warrant in most circum-
stances. 0 As Nakell observed:
[The] rapid availability of a warrant could mean that some
search situations now considered sufficiently exigent to justify
dispensing with a warrant-such as searches of motor vehicles-
might no longer carry their emergency character. As a result, the
reason for excusing the failure to obtain a search warrant in
those situations would no longer exist."'
A request for a telephonic search warrant in this instance has
benefits to both law enforcement and the public. In most automo-
bile stops, immediate action by the officer is not required. A sus-
pect can easily be detained just as a motor vehicle can be immobi-
lized while an officer seeks advance judicial approval for a search.
Although this places a burden on law enforcement, it increases the
likelihood that a search will be valid, and serves to protect the sus-
38. See, e.g., United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (officer learned
that defendant was going to dispose of shotgun that was evidence of armed robbery); United
States v. Allison, 639 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (drugs threatened with destruction); United
States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (weapon threatened with imminent destruc-
tion coupled with threat to human life). The court in McEachin noted:
Consistent with Congress' intent, we believe that the courts must consider the
availability of a telephonic warrant in determining whether exigent circum-
stances existed, unless it is clear that the exigency of a particular case was so
great that it precluded recourse to any warrant procedure, however brief. Be-
cause the Government bears the burden of proving the existence of exigent cir-
cumstances, it must ordinarily introduce evidence on the availability of a tele-
phonic warrant and on the time required to obtain one.
670 F.2d at 1147.
39. See generally Alpert and Haas, The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 35 ALA. L.
REV. 23 (1984).
40. See Heisse, supra note 36.
41. Nakell, Proposed Revisions of North Carolina's Search and Seizure Law, 52 N.C.L.
REV. 277, 311 (1973).
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pect's constitutional rights.4"
D. Other Related Concerns
The issues of privacy and consent must both be considered as
jurisdictions adopt a policy that permits telephonic search war-
rants. In situations involving motor vehicles, it is quite possible
that an innocent suspect could be delayed at the scene of a lawful
stop while a warrant is being secured. This may infringe on three
of the suspect's interests: (1) his interest in continuing; (2) his ex-
pectation of privacy; and (3) his willingness to consent to a search.
If a suspect is detained while a telephonic search warrant is being
sought, then his freedom of movement is restricted. Alternatively,
if a warrantless search is conducted, the suspect's privacy is in-
vaded. A solution to this dilemma was submitted by Justice Harlan
in Chambers v. Maroney. s Justice Harlan suggested that a suspect
select which interest shall be compromised by: (1) consenting to a
warrantless search, which will minimize delay; or (2) insisting upon
judicial intervention, which protects his privacy.
The privacy issue revolves around one's expectation of privacy
in his motor vehicle.44 In states that do not have the benefit of
telephonic search warrants, the delay and inconvenience to police
officers in acquiring search warrants have been balanced against
the privacy interests of the suspect. The result has been to allow
warrantless searches in some areas, but not in others.45
Finally, the widespread use of telephonic warrants may have a
profound impact on a suspect's willingness to consent to a search.
If an individual knows that a warrant is just a phone call away, he
may be more willing to consent to a search than he would be if the
convenience of a telephonic search warrant were not available.46
This in turn raises the question of whether a police officer has a
duty to advise the suspect of his right to refuse consent.47
There may exist numerous other problems and issues that
arise from the use of telephonic search warrants. If states analyze
42. See Heisse, supra note 36.
43. 399 U.S. 42, 63-65 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 442 U.S. 891 (1975) (border patrol stopped peti-
tioner's car at routine checkpoint and searched the trunk without a warrant); Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (petitioner was arrested, and his car impounded from a
public parking lot; the exterior of the car was inspected without a warrant).
45. See Heisse, supra note 36.
46. Consent must be voluntary, and not "the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied .... " Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
47. Id. at 231-33.
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the cases and specific problems experienced by those jurisdictions
with telephonic search warrants, then they can avoid making many
of the same mistakes. But what constitutes harmful error or harm-
less error is more problematic.48
IV. CONCLUSION
The reasonable acquisition of a search warrant probably has a
different meaning in the states that have telephonic search war-
rants available than in those that are limited to the traditional
methods of acquiring a warrant. The exigency of the circumstances
and the lapse of time required to obtain a warrant are the usual
situations that successfully fit within the category of lawful war-
rantless searches."' It makes sense, therefore, that states like Cali-
fornia and Arizona have passed such legislation. These states, with
wide open spaces and great distances between cities and judges,
were logically the first to enact laws that permit telephonic search
warrants. Florida is an excellent example of a state in which this
type of legislation is needed. For example, Monroe County is more
than 150 miles long, and so narrow that it is held together by one
predominantly two-lane road. In a recent search warrant case in
Monroe County, Third District Court of Appeal Judge Hendry
noted in dissent exactly why telephonic search warrants should be
made available: "[T]he incident took place on a Sunday and ...
the nearest judge in the Keys was at least fifty miles away, and if
he [were] unavailable all other judges were over 100 miles away."5
An intriguing possible policy involves the use of a sliding scale
to determine how a warrant is to be obtained. In most non-emer-
gency situations, or in those situations that do not inconvenience
law enforcement personnel, a traditional warrant should be re-
quired. Under circumstances that are more problematic or incon-
venient, telephone approval for a warrant would be reasonable. In
a bona fide emergency, a warrantless search could be conducted. 1
Law enforcement officers will be guided in the most efficient
and effective manner to obtain a search warrant by administrative
policies and, if necessary, by judicial rulemaking.52 Many jurisdic-
48. For example, South Carolina permits search warrants to be validly amended by
telephone prior to their execution, but no per se telephonic warrants are permitted. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-13-140 (Law Co-op. 1976).
49. See cases cited supra note 7.
50. Morejon v. State, 431 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (Hendry, J., dissenting).
51. See cases cited supra note 7.
52. See Alpert and Haas, supra note 39.
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tions still operate with only two methods of conducting lawful
searches: a traditional search warrant or a warrantless search. A
better option in many situations, the telephonic search warrant,
may soon be available to all law enforcement officers.5 3 Obtaining a
telephonic search warrant is a two-way communication: a double-
edged sword that helps to expedite law enforcement and that pro-
tects fourth amendment rights.
GEOFFREY P. ALPERT*
53. See authorities cited supra note 2.
* Director, Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of Miami; B.A. 1969,




Implementing the 1983 Telecommunications
in Evidence Act: Model Rules for
Conducting the Public's Business
On June 24, 1983, the Governor approved the Telecommunica-
tions in Evidence Act (the "Act"). The Act' requires state agencies
to adopt rules of procedure for conducting meetings, hearings and
workshops, and for taking evidence, testimony, and argument by
means of communications media technology. The term "communi-
cations media technology" is defined as "the electronic transmis-
sion of printed matter, audio, full motion video, freeze frame video,
compressed video, and digital video, by any means available."2
With the enactment of this piece of legislation, the State stands
poised to enter the electronic age of government.
Notwithstanding the eventual passage of the Act, it appeared
early in the 1983 session that a different policy might emerge. In
reaction to the perception that some agencies were circumventing
the Government-in-the-Sunshine Law3 through the use of tele-
1. FLA. STAT. S. 120.53 (1983) reads as follows:
Adoption of rules of procedure and public inspection.-
(6) Each state agency, as defined in s. 216.011, shall adopt rules providing a
procedure for conducting meetings, hearings, and workshops, and for taking evi-
dence, testimony, and argument at such meetings, hearings, and workshops, by
means of communications media technology. The rules shall provide that all evi-
dence, testimony, and argument presented shall be afforded equal consideration,
regardless of the method of communication. If a meeting, hearing, or workshop
is to be conducted by means of communications media technology, or if attend-
ance may be provided by such means, the notice shall so state. The notice for
meetings, hearings, and workshops utilizing communications media technology
shall state how persons interested in attending may do so and shall name loca-
tions, if any, where communications media technology facilities will be available.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to diminish the right to inspect
public records under chapter 119. Limiting points of access to meetings, hear-
ings, and workshops subject to the provisions of s. 286.011 to places not normally
open to the public shall be presumed to violate the right of access of the public,
and any official action taken under such circumstances is void and of no effect.
Other laws relating to public meetings, hearings, and workshops, including penal
and remedial provisions, shall apply to meetings, hearings, and workshops con-
ducted by means of communications media technology and shall be liberally
construed in their application to such meetings, hearings, and workshops.
2. FLA. STAT. § 120.52 (1983).
3. Section 286.011 of the Florida Statutes declares that "[aIll meetings of any board or
commission of any state agency or authority . . . , except as otherwise provided in the Con-
stitution, at which official acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to
the public at all times. ... This provision has been consistently interpreted by both the
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
phone conference meetings, Senate Bill 26 was prefiled in Decem-
ber 1982 to prohibit the conduct of public meetings by means of
telephone conference calls." The Senate Committee on Govern-
mental Operations heard lengthy testimony from numerous state
agencies supporting the continued use of telephone conference
meetings.5 Two points that became obvious during the hearings
were that: (1) telephone conferencing is considerably cheaper than
the convening of members from the four corners of the state, and
that (2) telephone conferencing can be conducted in a manner that
does not interfere with the public's right to attend meetings held
by its elected and appointed officials.'
While Senate Bill 26 was winding its way toward eventual re-
jection, three other bills were filed, each of which specifically au-
thorized telephone conference meetings as well as other forms of
audio and video conferencing.7 House Bill 1257 was the first to
reach the floor, passing in the House by a vote of 105-4 on May 24,
1983.8 It was immediately sent to the Senate where it was referred
to the Committee on Governmental Operations, which had already
passed out Committee Substitute Senate Bill (CS/SB) 803, a bill
identical to House Bill 1257. On June 1, the bill was withdrawn
from Committee, substituted for CS/SB 803 and passed by a vote
courts and the Attorney General to require that every step in the decision making process of
a collegial public body be open and accessible to the public. See, e.g., Board of Public In-
struction of Broward County v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1960); Times Publishing Co. v.
Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); 1981 FLA. Ar'v GEN. ANN. REP. 1.51 (No. 081-
51), 1980 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 250 (No. 080-99), 1976 FLA. ATT'Y GEN. REP. 186 (No.
076-102), 1975 FLA. Arr'Y GEN. REP. 61 (No. 075-37), 1974 FLA. ATT'Y GEN. REP. 604 (No.
074-364).
4. Senate Bill 26 by the Committee on Governmental Operations was identical to Sen-
ate Bill 151, which had been filed during the 1982 session by Senator Paul Steinberg. Senate
Bill 151 died on the Senate Calendar after being recommended by the Senate Committee on
Governmental Operations. FLA. S. Joua., 1982 Reg. Sess. at 19, 47 and 654. The Staff Analy-
sis of Senate Bill 26 reports that, ,while the number of telephone conference meetings held
by regulatory boards within the Department of Professional Regulation in fiscal year 1979-
80 totaled only five, that number had jumped to forty-five during fiscal year 1981-82 STAFF
ANALYSIS AND EcONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, Senate Bill 26 (December 21, 1982). The Com-
mittee was clearly concerned that telephone conference meetings could be used as a mecha-
nism for excluding the public from attending public meetings.
5. Tapes of the committee hearings are on file in the committee's offices.
6. The staff analysis prepared for Senate Bill 26 notes that a typical meeting of one of
the regulatory boards within the Department of Professional Regulation costs $2750.00
while the cost of convening the board with a telephone conference hookup is only $350.00.
Senate STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, Senate Bill 26 (December 21,
1982).
7. See Senate Bill 803, Senate Bill 1062 and House Bill 1257, 1983 Legislative Session.
8. Journal of the House of Representatives, State of Florida, 1983 Regular Session, at
547 (May 24, 1983).
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of 31-1.1
While the Act itself calls for each state agency to adopt proce-
dural rules for the use of communications media technology, the
Attorney General felt that it would be appropriate for the Admin-
istration Commission to adopt a set of model rules to serve as
guidelines for all state agencies.'0 Consequently, the Attorney Gen-
eral wrote to the Secretary of the Administration Commission to
ask that this be done. 1 He noted that in the past, the Department
of Legal Affairs12 had been responsible for drafting the model rules
for the Administration Commission, and suggested that it would be
appropriate to request the Governor and Cabinet, as the head of
the Commission, to officially delegate that responsibility to the De-
partment. On July 19, 1983 that delegation was approved.
The Department developed a working draft of the proposed
model rules. 13 At the time of this writing, those rules have not been
adopted by the Administration Commission.' 4 They are offered
here, however, under the presumption that they do represent a re-
alistic and fundamentally sound approach to fulfilling the compli-
ance requirements of the Act and the authority delegated to the
Department.
PERCY W. MALLISON, JR.*
9. Journal of the Senate, State of Florida, 1983 Regular Session, at 647 (June 1, 1983).
10. Section 120.54(10) of the Florida Statutes authorizes the Governor and Cabinet,
sitting as the Administration Commission, to promulgate model rules of procedure to govern
the procedural operations of each state agency subject to the Administrative Procedure Act
so long as and to the extent that an individual agency does not adopt a specific rule covering
the same subject matter. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(10) (1981).
11. Letter from Jim Smith to Tom Herndon (July 8, 1983) (available in the University
of Miami Law Review office).
12. The Attorney General is the head of the Department of Legal Affairs. FLA. STAT. §
20.11 (1969).
13. A rough draft of the model rules was the subject of a rules workshop held in Talla-
hassee on December 2, 1983. As a result of comments received at that time, several changes
were made to the proposed rules, and a second draft was prepared. It is that draft which is
incorporated as part of this article.
14. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1981), which sets out the procedures for rule adoption.




Proposed Model Rules of Procedure
Section 1. GENERAL.
The purpose of this chapter is to implement the provisions of
§120.53(6), F.S., by providing general procedures to be followed by
an agency which desires to conduct a meeting or workshop by
means of communications media technology or in conjunction with
communications media technology.
Section 2. APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION.
In accordance with the provisions of §120.53(6), F.S., an
agency may conduct a meeting or workshop by using communica-
tions media technology or, alternatively, may provide communica-
tions media technology access to a meeting or workshop for pur-
poses of taking evidence, testimony or argument. Unless an agency
adopts its own rules of procedure, these rules shall prescribe the
manner in which an agency shall conduct meetings or workshops
by means of or in conjunction with communications media
technology.
These rules shall not apply to any meeting or workshop not
being held by means of or in conjunction with communications me-
dia technology merely because the proceedings are being broadcast
over a communications network. Neither shall these rules be con-
strued to require an agency to conduct any meeting or workshop
by means of or in conjunction with communications media technol-
ogy. Furthermore, these rules shall not be construed to limit the
authority of the chairperson or hearing officer to conduct any
meeting or workshop in such a fashion as to maintain decorum and
order.
These rules do not apply to any court, or agency thereof, for
which the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction under Section
2 of Article V, State Constitution, to adopt rules of procedure.
Section 3. DEFINITIONS.
Access Point means a designated place where a person interested
in attending a CMT meeting or workshop may go for purposes of
attending such meeting or workshop.
Agency means any official, officer, commission, board, authority,
council, committee, or department of the executive branch of
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state government.
Attend means having access to the communications media technol-
ogy network being used to conduct a meeting or workshop, or
being used to take evidence, testimony or argument relative to
any issue being considered at a meeting or workshop.
Chairperson means the person appointed or selected to preside at
a meeting or workshop.
CMT means communications media technology.
CMT Meeting or Workshop means a meeting or workshop that is
conducted by means of or in conjunction with communications
media technology.
Communications Media Technology shall have the same meaning
as is provided in §120.52(15), F.S.
In Conjunction with Communications Media Technology means
that CMT access is being provided to a meeting or workshop
otherwise being held with the collective, physical presence of the
members of the agency in one place.
By Means of Communications Media Technology means that a
meeting or workshop is being conducted entirely by means of
communications media technology and the members of the
agency conducting such meeting or workshop are not collec-
tively, physically together in one place.
Section 4. GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE.
In accordance with the provisions of §286.011, F.S., all meet-
ings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority,
unless exempted by law, at which official acts are to be taken, are
public meetings which shall be open to the public at all times.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to permit an agency to
conduct any meeting or workshop otherwise subject to the provi-
sions of §286.011 by means of communications media technology
without making provision for the attendance at that meeting or
workshop of any member of the public who desires to attend.
An agency may not limit the points of access provided to the
public to places not normally open to the public. An agency must
provide at least one access point in a location which is ordinarily
open to the public and, depending upon the nature of and the pub-
lic interest in the CMT meeting or workshop, should provide more
than one access point. Any official action taken at a CMT meeting
or workshop subject to the provisions of §286.011 to which at least
one access point is not provided shall be void and of no effect as
being violative of the public's right of access.
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No meeting or workshop otherwise subject to §286.011, F.S.,
shall be conducted entirely by means of communications media
technology if the available technology is insufficient to permit all
interested persons to attend. If, during the course of a CMT meet-
ing or workshop, technical problems develop with the communica-
tions network that prevent interested persons from attending, the
agency shall terminate the meeting or workshop until such
problems have been corrected.
Section 5. NOTICE.
An agency choosing to conduct a CMT meeting or workshop
shall provide notice in the same manner as required for a regular
meeting or workshop, except that the notice shall be given at least
fourteen days in advance (except in the case of an emergency
meeting which shall be noticed as provided in Rule 28-2.07) and
shall plainly state that such meeting or workshop is to be con-
ducted by means of or in conjunction with communications media
technology. The notice shall also prescribe how interested persons
may attend and contain the address or addresses of all access
points, specifically designating those which are in locations nor-
mally open to the public. If, for example, a CMT meeting is to be
conducted by utilizing a telephone conference hookup, the notice
shall so state and shall provide the address of each access point
where an interested person may go for purposes of attending the
meeting. The notice may also contain an address and telephone
number where an interested person may write or call for additional
information and shall provide an address to which a person may
submit written or other physical evidence which he intends to offer
into evidence.
Section 6. EVIDENCE.
Any person who will be attending a meeting or workshop by
means of communications media technology and who desires to
submit written or other physical evidence shall submit the original
(or a certified copy) of the evidence to an address designated in the
notice at least seven (7) days in advance of the scheduled meeting
or workshop.
An agency receiving evidence in advance of a meeting or work-
shop shall, provided that the form of the evidence permits it, pro-
vide copies to be inspected by all members of the agency who will
be participating in the meeting or workshop as well as a reasonable
19841
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number of copies to be inspected at each of the access points desig-
nated in the notice.
Any evidence otherwise admissible which is introduced by
means of communication media technology shall be afforded equal
consideration as if it were introduced by its proponent in person.
The chairperson may waive the advance submission require-
ment to the extent necessary upon application of any person or
party subject to the right of any affected person or party to object
to its admission into evidence. Where the advance submission re-
quirement is waived, the person offering the evidence may be per-
mitted to proffer such evidence subject to its subsequent admission
into evidence. The chairperson shall direct the person at the time
of the proffer to read or otherwise describe the proffered evidence
and to briefly state its relevance and the purpose for which it is
being offered. He shall also provide each affected party a time cer-
tain in which to object to the admission of the proffered evidence.
Section 7. TESTIMONY AND ARGUMENT.
Any person or party who would otherwise be authorized to tes-
tify or argue on any issue being considered at a CMT meeting or
workshop shall be entitled to so testify or argue through the com-
munications media technology network being utilized in conjunc-
tion with or to conduct said meeting or workshop unless for good
cause stated in the record the chairperson determines that per-
sonal testimony or argument is necessary. When otherwise re-
quired, the chairperson shall require said person or party to be
sworn before offering testimony or argument.
Any testimony or argument received by such method shall be
afforded equal consideration as if it were made in person, but shall
be subject to the same objections as if it were made in person.
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Proposed Rule of Judicial Administration
2.071: Use of Communication Equipment
(a) Definition
Communication equipment means a conference telephone
or other electronic device that permits all those appearing
or participating to hear and speak to each other, provided
that all conversation of all parties is audible to all persons
present in court, or in chambers.
(b) Use
A county, circuit or district court judge may, upon the
Court's own motion or on the written request of a party,
direct that communication equipment be used for a motion
hearing, pre-trial conference, or a status conference. A
judge must give notice to the parties before directing on
the Court's own motion that communication equipment be
used. A party's written request must be made at least seven
(7) days before the day on which communication equip-
ment is sought to be used.
(c) Testimony
A judge may, with the consent of all the parties, direct that
the testimony of a witness be taken through communica-
tion equipment.
(d) Burden of Expense
The cost for the use of the communication equipment is
the responsibility of the moving party unless otherwise di-
rected by the Court.
COMMENTARY:
This proposed rule is adopted largely from a rule first pro-
posed for use in Michigan in 1982, and finally adopted as Use of
Communication Equipment, Michigan General Court Rule 918,
West's Michigan Court Rules (Adopted March 1, 1983, effective
March 8, 1983). It has been modified using language from Rule 3.2
of the Local Rules for Practice for the Superior Court of Maricopa
County (adopted January 1, by Robert C. Broomfield, Presiding
Judge of the Superior Court, Maricopa County, and approved by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Arizona on January 6,
1981. Effective January 12, 1981). The additional language re-
quires, at the Court's end of things, that the proceedings be audi-
ble to all persons present in court or chambers. This would effec-
tively preclude the Court from being on the telephone and would
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mandate the use of speaker phones.
The issue of the recording of the proceedings is not addressed,
as it is felt that recording would be governed in telephone hearings,
as any other hearing, by Rule 2.070(a) of the Florida Rules of Judi-
cial Administration. This is a modification of the Michigan rule,
which requires verbatim transcription of all telephone hearings. Of
course, this requirement could be added, should the committee
desire.
An additional alternative form of the proposed rule might fol-
low Washington Rule of Appellate Procedure 17.5(e), and the final
form of the Michigan rule when approved, which provides for costs
to be shared equally by the parties unless otherwise directed by
the Court. It was felt by the proposer that this allocation proce-
dure might prove cumbersome to both determine and collect.
Pursuant to Rule 2.130(b) of the Florida Rules of Judicial Ad-
ministration, a copy of this rule has been forwarded in writing to
the Clerk of the Supreme Court for referral to the appropriate
committee of the Florida Bar for consideration as a rule of judicial
administration in Florida.
J. ALLISON DEFOOR, II*
* Monroe County Judge, Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida.
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Major Findings of the New Mexico
Experiment of Teleconferenced
Administrative Fair Hearings
Over a four-year period ending in 1981, the Fair Hearing Pro-
ject 1 undertook an extensive investigation of the use of telephone
conferencing in conducting unemployment insurance and welfare
administrative appeals in New Mexico. With the support of the
New Mexico Department of Employment Security (ESD) and the
New Mexico Department of Human Services (DHS), the endorse-
ment of federal funding agencies, and the cooperation of the Albu-
querque Legal Aid Society, a successful pilot study was undertaken
in 1978. In the fall of 1979, a full-scale, randomized field test was
begun.
In the unemployment insurance test, over 1,000 cases were as-
signed into the experiment. From the smaller population of welfare
cases that was available, over 100 appeals in the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamp (FS) programs
were included in the test. Somewhat more than half of all cases
were conducted by telephone.
This discussion represents the highlighting of major findings
1. This research was funded by the National Science Foundation, Grant No. APR-
7715516, July 15, 1977; and Grant No. DAR-7715516, February 16, 1979. Charles Brownstein
and Arthur F. Konopka of the National Science Foundation were instrumental at every step
of this research. Additional funding for the experiment with unemployment insurance ap-
peals was obtained from the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor. Supplemental funding for the experiment with welfare hearings was ob-
tained from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Grant No. 18-0-00114-8-
01, and from the Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Grant
No. 53-3198-0-23. Any findings, opinions, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in
this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding
agencies.
The research project came to be known as "The Fair Hearing Project." Research was
conducted with the cooperation of both the University of New Mexico and the University of
Denver, between March 1977 and May 1981. Authors would like to acknowledge the follow-
ing professional research staff who contributed to the development of this project: Thomas
L. Hurley, Joseph Goldberg, Harry P. Stumpf, and Gary D. Libecap. Also acknowledged are
the following research assistants: Susan Williams, Marilyn Jackson, Jane Herron, and
Michael Condon.
Previously published results of this study can be found in the legal literature. See Corsi
& Hurley, Attitudes Toward the Use of the Telephone in Administrative Fair Hearings:
The California Experience, 31 AD. L. REv. 247 (1979), and Corsi & Hurley, Pilot Study
Report on the Use of the Telephone in Administrative Fair Hearings, 31 AD. L. REV. 485
(1979).
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initially presented in May 1981, along with a comprehensive two-
volume final research report. All data discussed here involve the
primary analysis of the major dataset, consisting of 399 "active"
unemployment insurance appeals and 52 "active" welfare cases. An
"active" case was defined as one conducted as assigned (i.e., in per-
son or by telephone), in which researchers were able to complete
all required interviews and collect all specified documentary data.
The summary nature of this discussion virtually necessitates
eliminating all technical presentation of research methodology and
statistical data analysis. Rather, our purpose here is to direct at-
tention to the major findings, emphasizing the conclusions made
possible through demanding scientific analysis.
I. RESEARCH PROBLEM
The purpose of the research was to examine the effects of tele-
phone conferencing utilized as a substitute for in-person hearings.
Research focused on the appeals hearings conducted by the eight
ESD appeals referees and the two DHS hearings officers. Essen-
tially, three research questions were asked:
1. Are hearings conducted over the telephone perceived to meet
due process standards as specified by the courts for administra-
tive hearings?
2. Is the quality of the hearing changed by the introduction of
telephone conferencing?
3. Are telephone hearings cost-effective?
In the unemployment insurance experiment, two separate hearing
modes were selected for analysis: (1) the "split telephone hearing,"
in which all participants were permitted to remain at locations of
their choosing and the appeals referee initiated a multi-party con-
ference call from the main ESD office at the Tiwa Building in Al-
buquerque; and, (2) the "office telephone hearing," in which par-
ticipants were instructed to come to an outlying ESD area office
and the appeals referee initiated a two-party conference call link-
ing the hearing room in the Tiwa Building with the local area office
where the participants gathered. These two hearing forms were
chosen to determine whether or not the official hearing room set-
ting in the office telephone hearing context led to important differ-
ences in outcome when compared to the split telephone hearing.
The split telephone configuration was designed to maximize the
potential of teleconferencing so as to provide for participant
convenience.
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The telephone hearing in the welfare experiment involved
having all parties to the hearing gather at a local DHS office in the
presence of the caseworker, with the hearing officer linked by tele-
phone from the main DHS office in Santa Fe. Researchers initially
considered implementing an additional experimental condition
comparable to the split conference telephone mode that was tested
in the unemployment insurance experiment. DHS officials, how-
ever, as well as officials from the U.S. Department of Human Ser-
vices and the Food and Nutrition Service of the Department of
Agriculture, felt strongly that clients should still be required to ap-
pear in person at a county DHS office for a telephone hearing.
Welfare officials argued that clients normally file for benefits
at an agency county office, where they receive services and consul-
tation from a caseworker. Caseworkers at the county office regu-
larly attend hearings, often accompanied by a casework supervisor.
With clients and caseworkers present in the same room, officials
felt that the testimony, cross-examination, and the use of docu-
mentary evidence would be facilitated. All testimony, questioning
(other than questions involving the hearing officer), and submis-
sions of documents into the record by caseworkers, clients, or rep-
resentatives of either, thus took place among the participants gath-
ered together in person. Only the hearing officer appeared via
teleconferencing.
II. HEARING OUTCOME
One of the most important concerns of the study involved the
question of whether hearing outcomes would be affected by
teleconferencing. In the unemployment insurance experiment, the
compsarison between in-person and split telephone hearings was
nearly identical, with approximately 51 % of all appeals upheld in
both modes. While the difference was not statistically significant, a
greater tendency was exhibited in office telephone hearings for ap-
peals to be denied. Specifically, in office telephone hearings, only
44.6% of all appeals were upheld. Given that over 80% of all un-
employment insurance appellants were employees, researchers con-
cluded that a higher denial percentage in office telephone hearings
suggested a moderate (though not statistically significant) effect of
this mode upon employee hearing performance.
The office telephone hearing was a somewhat artificial hearing
setting, in that the employee and the previous employer in ques-
tion were the only parties asked to appear in person at the distant
hearing office. Here they faced the teleconferencing equipment
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over which the appeals referee conducted the hearing. After a job
separation, employees and their former employers generally have
little reason to gather together. At an in-person hearing, their
meeting is mediated by a presiding appeals referee. Tension that
led to or followed the job separation is frequently evident in unem-
ployment insurance hearings. As reflected in the outcome figures,
this particular meeting might well generate a situation that is det-
rimental to certain employees who might feel slightly less able to
express themselves or somewhat more intimidated in this setting.
Once again, however, we must stress that this difference did not
reach the level of statistical significance.
Welfare cases involved a relatively complex decision sequence.
For both in-person and telephone hearings, a hearing officer pre-
pared a recommendation shortly after the conclusion of the study,
following the receipt of the transcript and submitted documents
from the local county office where the hearing was held. The hear-
ing officer recommendation was then reviewed by the Fair Hearing
Review Committee, generally a three-person review panel includ-
ing the relevant program specialist (i.e., the Program Specialist for
AFDC or the Program Specialist for FS) and the agency legal
counsel. After considering the recommendations of the hearing of-
ficer and the Review Committee, the DHS Director rendered the
final decision.
In neither hearing officer recommendations nor in agency deci-
sions were there any large (or statistically significant) differences
in results. Regarding hearing officer recommendations, there was a
slightly greater tendency in telephone hearings to favor the client;
however, regarding agency decision outcomes, the percentages in
both modes were virtually identical (in favor of the agency: in-per-
son hearings 51.7%, telephone hearings 52.2%).
The largest outcome differences in welfare hearings did not
concern hearing mode at all. Rather, the largest shifts occurred in
the degree to which the DHS Director found in favor of the client:
hearing officers recommended in favor of clients about 25-30% of
the time; the Agency Director was likely to find in this direction
virtually half the time. Importantly, for the purposes of this study,
none of the outcome results (or the relationships between hearing
officer recommendation or final decision) appear altered at all by
the use of teleconferencing to conduct the hearing.
III. PARTICIPANT RESPONSES
Interviews conducted with hearing participants (including ap-
[Vol. 38:647
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE COURTROOM
peals referees, employers, and employees, in the unemployment in-
surance test; hearing officers, case workers, and clients, in the wel-
fare experiment) asked a detailed set of questions concerning a
variety of reactions to the hearing experience. Only the most cen-
tral summary questions will be, discussed here.
In the unemployment insurance experiment, employees re-
ported the highest overall satisfaction for the split telephone hear-
ing (73.3% satisfied); employer satisfaction with both telephone
hearing mode (84.6% satisfied in each of the two conditions) ex-
ceeded their satisfaction with in-person hearings (79.8%). None of
the differences were statistically significant. Appeals referee satis-
faction in all hearing modes was nearly identical, with between 85-
86% reporting that they were satisfied.
In the welfare experiment, approximately 65% of the clients
in both in-person and telephone hearings reported being satisfied
with the hearing. The pattern of response to this question by cli-
ents in in-person hearings compared to clients in telephone hear-
ings was so close as to be virtually identical. A slightly higher per-
centage of caseworkers indicated they were more satisfied with
telephone hearings (73.7%) than with in-person hearings (61.9%).
In both hearing modes, hearing officers were by far the participant
group most satisfied with the hearing, responding between 15-30
percentage points higher on this question than had clients or
caseworkers. Again, little difference was noticeable between hear-
ing modes. Over 90% of the time, hearing officers in both in-person
and telephone hearings reported being satisfied.
In both experiments, one of the strongest relationships ob-
served in the entire study emerged from the delayed interviews
conducted after participants knew the hearing outcomes. Not sur-
prisingly, winners generally tended to remain satisfied with the
hearing and losers became dissatisfied. Still, losing did not alto-
gether affect the willingness of those in telephone hearings to have
another hearing held by teleconferencing. Participants were more
able to sort out their fate in the hearing and their attitude toward
teleconferencing than they were able to distinguish winning and
losing from their overall attitude toward the hearing itself.
IV. PEER REVIEW EVALUATION
While participant attitudinal response was an important indi-
cator of satisfaction with the hearing, researchers sought to obtain
a more objective assessment of hearing quality. Beginning in
March, 1980, researchers began preparing cases for submission to
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experts in the fields of unemployment insurance and welfare
appeals.
Several steps were involved in this peer review process. First, a
sample of 120 unemployment insurance cases were randomly se-
lected from the population of active experimental cases; 44 cases in
the welfare test (approximately 85% of all active cases) were se-
lected. This set of cases constituted the population of peer review
cases. All case file and transcript material for each case was edited:
(a) to remove any individual or other identifying information, and
(b) to remove any references (including comments during a hear-
ing) which might suggest whether the hearing was conducted in-
person or by telephone. When accomplishing these editing pur-
poses, researchers sought to retain all substantive hearing informa-
tion and participant interactions so as to avoid altering the case
content of the hearing. Each edited transcript was checked by
three separate researchers. One of these readings included examin-
ing the edited hearing transcript against the primary data of the
hearing audio-tape recording.
Each of the two review panels included 25 nationally recog-
nized experts drawn from state and federal agencies, advocacy
agencies, legal aid groups, and academic institutions.
Reviewers, provided with the written record of each case, were
asked their opinion regarding how the hearing was actually con-
ducted, in-person or by telephone. In the unemployment insurance
experiment, approximately half the time reviewers judged that in-
person cases were held by telephone, and vice versa. Researchers
concluded that reviewers correctly classified the hearing mode at a
rate only slightly higher than would be expected by random guess-
ing. Results in the welfare experiment were nearly identical, with
only a slight indication that in-person hearings could be reliably
determined as such by reviewers detecting cues from the written
record.
Overall, the reviewers appeared equally satisfied that hearings
in all three modes met the established due process standards. In
the unemployment insurance experiment, nearly three-fourths of
all peer review evaluations in each hearing mode reflected reviewer
satisfaction that the hearing met legal due process standards. In
the welfare experiment, nearly 80% of the time in both modes, re-
viewers reported being satisfied on this question.
V. COST-EFFICIENCY
New Mexico is distinguished by its large geographical size and
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relatively small population. As the fifth largest state in terms of
territory, New Mexico, during the years of the test had a largely
rural population of under 1.5 million. Approximately 65% of all
New Mexico population centers have less than 2,500 residents.
To meet hearing demand throughout the state, New Mexico's
eight unemployment insurance appeals referees in 1977 made 70
trips, covering approximately 36,836 miles; in 1978, the figures
were 95 trips and 55,252 miles. In 1977, the average trip lasted 3.5
days, covered about 526 miles, and included stops for hearings at
five different locations with an average of seven hearings scheduled
at each location. In 1978, the comparable averages were as follows:
trip duration, 3.4 days; 582 total miles covered on a trip; five hear-
ing locations per trip; with six hearings scheduled at each location.
To meet hearings on time, appeals referees frequently began their
driving days as early as 6:00 A.M., continuing (after holding hear-
ings all day) to their next location so they could spend the night at
or near the next day's first hearing site. Based on an eight-hour
day and average highway speeds, researchers concluded that New
Mexico appeals referees in 1977 spent 103 working days driving,
with a 1978 total of 147.5 working days consumed on the road.
Given the lower volume of welfare appeals, most trips involved
one hearing, scheduled to avoid time delays that would compro-
mise legal requirements for hearing promptness. In 1976, the two
welfare hearing officers made 195 trips, driving 47,752 miles; in
1977, a total of 173 trips covered 44,321 miles; and in 1978, 151
trips involved 42,183 miles. Thus, the welfare hearing officers spent
almost as much time on the road as their unemployment insurance
counterparts, despite their considerably smaller caseload. Re-
searchers concluded that each of the two hearing officers spent one
of every four working days doing nothing but driving.
In both hearing settings, researchers examined a variety of in-
person and telephone configurations that could be established to
hold hearings most economically. Consistently, the conclusion was
reached that time lapses could be reduced and expenses saved by
holding remote hearings by phone and scheduling in-person hear-
ings only in the cities where hearing officers were stationed or in
cities with a sufficient population density to generate a reasonable
hearing volume to justify travel. Cost-savings were identified even
if the state were to establish a relatively sophisticated and expen-
sive teleconferencing network devoted exclusively (or primarily)
for hearing purposes.
The economic decision whether to travel to a given location or
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to conduct telephone hearings was seen to key on several factors:
the average cost per call of the particular teleconferencing hearing
capability the agency chose to establish; the distance of a hearing
site from the hearing officer's home station; and the volume of
hearings at a given location. The larger the value placed on reduc-
ing time lapse, the greater was the efficiency of teleconferencing in
providing timely appeal response at New Mexico's many remote
and sparsely populated locations. Finally, by reducing the amount
of time hearing officers must spend on the road, considerable gains
could be achieved in their productivity.
VI. CONCLUSION
When appeals referees and hearing officers in New Mexico
first heard of the teleconferencing experiment, their initial reaction
tended to be apprehension, if not hostility. Many expressed con-
cern that the inability to see participants would adversely affect
their ability to obtain the needed facts and make correct
determinations.
The experience of the full-scale randomized field-test rein-
forced the positive results of the earlier pilot test. After a few ini-
tial tries, appeals referees and hearing officers surprised themselves
in their ability during telephone hearings to focus on the record
and to obtain the information needed to reach a decision. Those
involved in the test began to consider that sight, while a preferred
sense, may not be an indispensible requirement for a due process
fair hearing. All the hard data collected in this extensive investiga-
tion supports that conclusion.
If anything, researchers were disappointed that so few statisti-
cally significant differences appeared in the literally hundreds of
separate measures of hearing activity taken on in-person and tele-
phone comparisons. The physical hearing records, decision out-
comes, and participant reactions with both in-person hearings and
telephone hearings were nearly identical. Surprisingly, with in-
creased experience, some hearing officers actually came to prefer
the teleconferenced hearing; and, throughout the study, research-
ers uncovered evidence that the teleconferenced approach could
actually increase the comfort level of those hearing participants
who might otherwise be inclined to be intimidated by the some-
what more confrontational nature of the in-person encounter.
Given these results, researchers could find no empirical basis
of experimental evidence which would lead to a conclusion that the
agencies should resist taking advantage of the savings teleconfer-
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encing offered in the areas of cost-savings, time lapse reductions,
and productivity improvements. After four years of the most
painstaking social-scientific examination researchers could design,
teleconferencing survived the test, defying initial intuitions that
sight (or at least the in-person interaction) was an essential ingre-
dient of a "fair hearing" if it were to remain fair in terms of the
record generated, the nature of the outcome, the judgement of peer
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The Use of Closed Circuit Television for
Conducting Misdemeanor Arraignments in
Dade County, Florida
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 15, 1982, The Honorable Gerald T. Wetherington,
Chief Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida (Dade
County), signed an Administrative Order directing the use of tele-
vision equipment to conduct misdemeanor first appearances for a
trial period of ninety days.' On February 9, 1983, the Eleventh Ju-
dicial Circuit approved the use of television equipment on a regu-
lar basis to conduct misdemeanor arraignments.2 In Dade County,
the huge number of cases in every division of the county court
(civil, misdemeanors, and traffic) had increased without a matching
increase in the number of judges or judicial support personnel.
Therefore, it became necessary to adopt new ways to handle this
load, while preserving the rights of citizens to individual
treatment.3
Misdemeanor defendants are arraigned through two-way
closed-circuit television by a judge located in the courthouse. The
defendants remain at the jail during the arraignment proceedings,
which are videotaped simultaneously. The video tape is the official
record of the proceedings. Misdemeanor arraignments held on the
weekend are conducted without the use of video.
A court manager considering the use of audio/video equipment
will first be confronted with state statutes, court procedural rules
and constitutional questions. Although there is a distinction be-
tween the legal questions involved in using audio/video equipment
and videotape, the central issues are the same-the defendant's
rights to due process, the confrontation of witnesses, the effective
assistance of counsel, and a public trial. Evaluators of the Office of
1. On October 12, 1982, The Honorable Marshall T. Ader, Administrative Judge of the
County Court, Traffic Division, requested the Office of the Dade-Miami Criminal Justice
Council to undertake an objective study of the video system for the courts. The study evalu-
ated the efficiency of the system in terms of cost, time, security, and effectuation of the
defendants' legal rights, and forms the basis of this article. OFFICE OF THE DADE-MIAMI
CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL, EVALUATION OF THE USE OF MISDEMEANOR FIRST APPEARANCES
[hereinafter cited as EVALUATION].
2. Admin. Order No. 83-6, 11th Judicial Circuit, Dade County, Fla., Feb. 9, 1983.
3. Ader, County Judges Trying Innovations, MIAMI REVIEW, April 29, 1983, at 6, col. 1.
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the Miami-Dade Criminal Justice Council conducted personal in-
terviews with legal and support personnel of the criminal justice
system, analyzed written questionnaires completed by the prison-
ers, judges, and staff of the state attorney's office and public de-
fender's office, and researched the legal questions arising from
videotaped first appearances. Costs were compared before and af-
ter the use of video. Where specific costs are unavailable, estimates
are given.
II. THE OPERATIONAL SYSTEM: THE USE OF VIDEO IN
MISDEMEANOR FIRST APPEARANCES
A. Description of the System
In the courtroom, the judge, the court clerks, and the assistant
state attorney view the defendant through a forty-five inch retract-
able TV screen placed at the front of the jury box. Members of the
public sitting in the courtroom view the defendant through a
twenty-five inch color television. A color video camera focuses on
the judge, but may be controlled to pick up the attorney or a mem-
ber of the defendant's family speaking before the court.
The defendant, who is in the jail across the street from the
courthouse, stands at a podium and views the judge through an-
other forty-five inch retractable screen. A second color video cam-
era at the jail is placed behind the TV screen. There are four pres-
sure sensitive microphones. Each one can capture the voice of a
person who is speaking from a distance of five feet. In the court-
room, one microphone is solely for the judge's use. One is located
at the clerk's table for use by the assistant state attorney, the court
clerk, or a member of the public speaking into the record. At the
jail, one microphone is located on the podium for the defendant
and the public defender. The final microphone is placed at a table
next to the podium of the control unit for the camera. A
microphone mixer controls the audio input from the various micro-
phones in the system. The mixer has the capacity for handling
eight microphones in addition to the four presently being used.
The main control system is located in the jury room and is
operated by a communication technician who controls all technical
aspects of the system. Two correctional officers sit at the table in
the jail where the remote control unit is located. The control room
operator maintains communications with one of these officers at
the jail and with the court clerk in the courtroom through the use
of a three-way headset intercom system. The correctional officer
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records the case disposition for the jail's records. The clerk in the
courtroom, if he has any questions, can communicate with the of-
ficer, who wears a headset, without disrupting the session.
A set of headsets is available for the defendant to communi-
cate with members of his family who may be in the courtroom,
without being heard by other parties in the court, or without hav-
ing the communication picked up by the video tape. This enables
the public defender who requests a side bar conference with the
assistant state attorney and the judge to conduct the discussion in
private, and out of the range of the other parties in the proceeding.
A special effects generator enables images from the camera in
the courtroom and the camera in the jail to be combined into a
split-screen single image, so that the video equipment tapes both
the judge and the defendant simultaneously. The single image is
recorded on two one-half inch video cassette recorders. One video-
tape is kept for three days, and if no party requests to review the
proceeding within that time, the tape is erased and reused. The
other tape is kept for five years, filed by month and by judge, and
stored in a locked cabinet in the jury room.
B. The Advantages of the System
In Dade County, the video tape project is considered a great
success.4 The courts expeditously handle the enormous caseloads
and receive financial benefits by using video arraignment. Person-
nel savings include the elimination of a court reporter and a liaison
officer, the savings of time for correctional officers and for the staff
of the clerk's office, and the reduction in the number of judges
used to hear first appearances. Leaving inmates at the jail allows
the court additional space to admit any family member or friend
who desires to view the session. The video focuses solely on the
judge and the defendant. All external noise is minimized and the
ability to deal exclusively and exhaustively with one case is
enhanced.
Security is maximized because the defendants do not leave the
jail. Video eliminates the prisoners' potential for causing disrup-
tion and inflicting harm. It must be noted, however, that the de-
fendant still has his or her right, upon request, to be brought to
the courtroom to see the judge in person.
An additional benefit of the video tape system is that the
videotape becomes the official record of proceedings. The tape en-
4. Ader, supra note 3, at 6.
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ables any party questioning the proceedings to examine the record
immediately after the session. It provides audiovisual record of the
proceedings and captures a more accurate recording of the pro-
ceeding. For example, video eliminates the problem faced by the
court reporter when more than one person speaks at a time. The
technician replaces the court reporter and has greater control over
the accuracy of what is recorded. If persons not participating in
the hearing create unnecessary noise, the technician can direct the
correctional officer or the clerk to quiet them without interrupting
the tape of the proceedings.
C. The Disadvantages of the System
The judge is prevented from having person-to-person contact
with the defendant. How this affects his ability to judge the defen-
dant's demeanor is unknown. Some technical problems that exist
are the inability to clearly see all of the defendants at one time, the
periodic inability to see and hear the assistant public defender and
the assistant state attorney, and the defendant's inability to simul-
taneously see the judge and the family member or friend request-
ing a custody release. There is also a potential for technical
malfunction.
The change to video arraignments caused a slowdown in the
flow of paperwork from one department/office to another.
Paperwork could no longer be handed across the table. The assis-
tant public defender had to get a copy of the charging documents
before going to the jail. This was unnecessary when the public de-
fender had access to the clerk's file in court. Additionally, the
paperwork requiring signatures has to be hand carried from the
courtroom to the jail and vice versa.
D. Changes in Administrative Procedure
The use of video created several changes in the administrative
procedure for conducting misdemeanor arraignments. Prior to the
use of video, misdemeanants were brought over to the court and
kept in either the holding cells located on the enclosed bridge con-
necting the jail to the courthouse, or in a cell located next to each
courtroom, until the session began. Two courtrooms with different
holding cells were used to eliminate the security problems created
by crowding defendants charged with misdemeanors into the same
holding cells as defendants charged with felonies. Often, more than
one trip was made from the holding cells on the bridge to the
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courtroom to transport a number of misdemeanants who could not
fit in the holding cell next to the court on the first trip. One court
is now used to conduct arraignments and bond hearings, while the
second is used for other judicial business.
The change in the procedure of holding misdemeanor arraign-
ments and bond hearings increased the efficiency of the judges.
Prior to the change to video, there were three misdemeanor ar-
raignments daily. Two county judges, acting as circuit court judges,
conducted the hearings at each session. One judge heard the mis-
demeanor arraignments and the other judge conducted the felony
bond hearings. Problems arose when arraignments lasted longer
than expected, and the judge had to delay hearing his own calen-
dar. Also, if a judge assigned to a particular session were in trial,
he would be unable to attend the arraignments, and scheduling
changes would have to be made at the last minute.
One judge does all misdemeanor and felony bond hearings for
the entire day by using video. There are twenty-two county court
judges who sit for these hearings on a rotating basis, Monday
through Friday, approximately once a month. Arraignments are
held two times daily instead of three.'
Prior to the use of video, the public was prevented from
watching the proceedings when the defendants filled the courtroom
to capacity. Now there is ample space for members of the defen-
dant's family. They can see the defendant via the twenty-five inch
color television located at the front of the audience seating area.
Defendants entitled to immediate release after the arraign-
ment are now released faster. They are taken to the front holding
cell on the first floor of the jail for release and receive their money
and belongings at that location.
Finally, because signatures are required on a special form by
parties not in the same place, the form had to be hand carried
from the courtroom to the jail, or vice versa. Now the judge signs
the form in the courtroom and the clerk stamps "sworn to in open
5. Statistical analysis shows that even though there is one less session in the afternoon,
an equivalent amount of cases are being processed. A statistical test (one-way analysis of
variance) was done to test whether the number of morning arraignments before and after
video differed, and whether the number of afternoon arraignments before and after video
differed. The month of July 15 to August 15, 1982 was compared to the month of September
15 to October 15, 1982 (Monday to Friday only). The test yielded the following results:
1) The introduction of video into the justice system has increased the processing of arraign-
ments scheduled for the morning session.
2) The implementation of the video system has not resulted in a significant difference in the
number of arraignments that have been processed during the afternoon sessions of court.
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The prohibition against telecommunication devices in the
courtroom setting is a result of a series of unhappy events.6 The
courts have enacted a prophylactic prohibition against all media
technology, as suggested by the canons of the American Bar
Association.
There is a trend toward continued experimentation with video
tape technology.' It appears that the evaluation of the technology
itself may be the most important factor to its future use in court
proceedings. As the equipment becomes less and less obtrusive and
as legal professionals become more comfortable with its use, the
general level of resistance should diminish.
B. Use of Closed Circuit Television in Dade County Court
This section discusses the legal issues relevant to the use of
closed circuit television for conducting first appearances of defen-
dants charged with misdemeanor crimes.9 Because Dade County is
6. Sparked by the spectacular publicity attendant to the trial of Bruno Hauptmann for
the Lindberg kidnapping, the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted a reso-
lution creating a Special Committee on Cooperation Between Press, Radio and Bar. The
resolution suggested a complete ban of radio broadcasting and still photography during judi-
cial proceedings to prevent a breach of judicial decorum. Additionally, Canon 35 was
adopted by the American Bar Association House of Delegates in 1937, proscribing photo-
graphic and broadcast coverage of courtroom proceedings. A second Special Committee of
the American Bar Association in 1952 produced a report that caused the House of Delegates
to amend Canon 35 to proscribe televising court proceedings as well. A majority of states
adopted the substance of Canon 35. Its current form (as of April 12, 1979) is found in Flor-
ida as Canon 3A(7). In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764,
770 (Fla. 1979).
7. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 35 (amended 1963) (improper publicizing of
court proceedings).
8. "An expanding cadre of jurists and other legal professionals has endorsed the use of
videotape in trial proceedings." Miller, Fontes, & Dalinke, Using Videotape in the Court-
room: A Four-Year Test Pattern, 55 U. DET. J. URB. L. 655, 656 (1978); see Bermant, Chap-
pell, Crockett, Jacoubovitch, & McGuire, Juror Responses to Prerecorded Videotape Trial
Presentations in California and Ohio, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 975 (1975); Brennan, Video-
tape-The Michigan Experience, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1972); McCrystal, Videotape Trials:
Relief for Our Congested Courts, 49 DEN. L.J. 463 (1973); Shutkin, Videotape Trials: Legal
and Practical Implications, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 363 (1973).
9. "Except when he has been previously released in a lawful manner, every arrested
person shall be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours of his arrest." FLA. R. CRiM. P.
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the first jurisdiction in Florida to use closed-circuit television for
conducting first appearances of misdemeanor defendants, the legal
issues concerning the use of this technology are of first impression
to the Florida Supreme Court. There is little case law directly on
point, and the issues are reasoned by analogy to existing law.
The points of reference for discussion were established by the
Florida Supreme Court in adopting the amended version of Canon
3A(7) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct 0 and was adopted
by the Supreme Court of the United States when it affirmed the
constitutionality of the new rule.1' The new Canon 3A(7) autho-
rizes the use of electronic media and still photography for use in
trial and appellate courts. 2 In Idaho, the supreme court authorized
rules permitting the use of closed circuit television to conduct mis-
demeanor first appearances and arraignments.1
3
In Dade County, the use of closed circuit television allows the
judge to remain in the courtroom while the misdemeanant defen-
dant is arraigned in the jail.' 4 It is constitutionally permissible
under both federal and Florida law.' 5 First, the defendant still is
present at the proceeding. He is able to see and converse with the
judge who; as well, can see and speak with him. The proceeding is
"live" because the transmission of the parties' images and voices
3.130(a).
10. In re Petition of the Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc. 370 So. 2d 764, 781,
(Fla. 1979).
11. Chandler v. State, 449 U.S. 560 (1980).
12, Canon 3A(7) states:
Subject at all times to the authority of the presiding judge to (i) control the
conduct of the procedings before the court, (ii) ensure decorum and prevent dis-
tractions, and (iii) ensure the fair administration of justice in the pending cause,
electronic media and still photography coverage of public judicial proceedings in
the appellate and trial courts of this state shall be allowed in accordance with
standards of conduct and technology promulgated by the Supreme Court of
Florida."
FLA. BAR CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3A(7) (amended April 12, 1979, effective May 1, 1979).
13. Idaho Criminal Rule 43.1 governs the use of electronic audiovisual devices in the
courtroom. Whenever a defendant in a misdemeanor or felony case is required to be taken
before a magistrate for a first appearance or arraingment, this requirement can be satisfied
by the defendant's appearance before a magistrate, either in person by electronic audiovi-
sual devices in the discretion of the magistrate.
14. If a sworn complaint charges the commission of a misdemeanor, then the defendant
may plead guilty to such charge at his first appearance. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.170(a), 3.130(a).
The judicial proceeding discussed here and the one for which closed-circuit television is
used is the first appearance for defendants charged with misdemeanor offenses. Id. The
Florida Rules governing the Practice and Procedure of Traffic Court are not discussed and
apply as they are relevant to this proceeding.
15. This discussion covers the rights guaranteed by U.S. CONST. amend. VI and FLA.
CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 14, & 16.
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over camera and monitors is instantaneous. Both parties at either
end of the circuit are able to hear and be heard, to see and be seen
simultaneously as the proceeding is conducted.
Second, the hearing remains procedurally the same as it was
when the defendants were brought to court from jail and is thus in
accordance with the requirements of the federal and Florida con-
stitutions. The defendants are advised of their rights under the
federal and Florida constitutions at the beginning of the hearing.16
The presiding judge hears the individual case of each defendant,
informs him of the charges, and then determines th6 appropriate
type or amount of bail.17
Third, first appearances are conducted in open court, and
therefore the public is able to view the defendant via a twenty-five
inch television monitor at the side of the courtroom. The defen-
dant is able to present witnesses because members of the defen-
dant's family may be present and may approach the bench for the
purpose of requesting the responsibility for his custody."
Fourth, the defendant is assured of the right to assistance of
counsel since an assistant public defender is present in the jail
with the defendant.
Fifth, closed circuit television preserves the attorney-client
privilege. The defendant is able to conduct private conversations
with his attorney, out of the range of the microphone or spoken in
whispers. In this manner, no other party may hear the attorney-
client discussions, nor is the conversation recorded on the video
tape.
Sixth, there is no evidence that conducting misdemeanor first
appearances has affected the impartiality of the judge in any way
that denies the defendant due process of law. On the contrary, the
closed-circuit enables the judge to better focus on the defendant
without being disturbed by extraneous noise or distractions.
Seventh, the use of electronic reporting is authorized by the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure and has been adopted for re-
16. Pursuant to U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, FLA. CONST. art. 1, and FLA. R. CRIM. PRO.
§ 16, 3.130(b), the magistrate, upon the defendant's first appearance, must immediately in-
form him of the charge, provide him with a copy of the complaint, and advise him of his
rights as enumerated in the rule.
17. The purpose of bail is to ensure the defendant's appearance in court for further
proceedings, and is defined as any of the six forms of release enumerated in FLA. R. CRIM. P.
131(b)(1)(i)(vi).
18. A microphone is placed at the table in front of the judge for use by members of the
public addressing the court.
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cording testimony in "any judicial proceedings."' 9
Finally, the use of closed-circuit television to conduct first ap-
pearances does not violate any principles of legal ethics."0
C. Discussion
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.180 provides that
the defendant is entitled to be present at his first appearance and
when a plea is made, unless a written plea of not guilty is made
pursuant to Rule 3.170(a). The presence of a defendant as a condi-
tion of due process, however, extends only to the point where his
absence would prevent him from receiving a fair and just hearing.2'
While the defendant in a first appearance hearing conducted
by closed-circuit television is not physically situated in the court-
room, he does attend the hearing. He is present in the jail and can
participate in a live proceeding where both the judge and he can
see each other, hear each other, and converse with each other si-
multaneously. Because the defendant is not "absent" from the pro-
ceeding, he is not deprived of a "fair and just" hearing merely be-
cause he is not present physically in the courtroom.
In Kansas City v. McCoy,22 the court upheld the examination
of an expert witness via closed-circuit television in a prosecution
for violation of a municipal ordinance. In ruling that the confron-
tation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution does not require that the expert testifying against the de-
fendant be physically present, the court held:
Today we have means of communication not available a few
years ago. We can by electronic means project the image and
voice of a man clearly and distinctly at the speed of light and
control that means and insure its integrity by closed circuit tele-
vision and monitors. While [the expert] was not physically pre-
sent in the courtroom, his image and his voice were there; they
were there for the purpose of examination ...of the witness
as much so as if he were there in person .... 2'
19. FLA. R. App. P. 2.070(c).
20. FLA. BAR CODE JUD. COND. Canon 3A(7).
21. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (applied in the context of a felony
prosecution; the defendant's presence as a prerequisite of due process in a misdemeanor
case would a fortiori appear to be less compelling).
22. 525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975).
23. Id. at 339 (emphasis added). Arguably, placing the defendant outside the court has
an impact on his performance; see Annot., 80 A.L.R. 3d 1212, 1214 (1977). But observation
of the use of closed-circuit television in Dade County revealed that the defendants took the
session seriously; see EVALUATION, supra note 1, at 24, Appendix 6.
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The defendant's right to a public pretrial hearing is not man-
dated by the United States Constitution, but is provided for under
Florida law. The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure require that
arraignment be conducted in "open court."24
The use of closed-circuit television to conduct these hearings
enhances this right by providing more courtroom space for the
public to attend. The public can both see the judge and view the
defendant on a twenty-five inch black and white monitor in the
courtroom. The image of the defendant on the monitor is the same
as that which the judge sees and that which is recorded simultane-
ously on video tape.
Furthermore, members of the defendant's family may ap-
proach the bench and converse with the judge and the defendant
through a microphone located there for the purposes of discussing
the defendant's release. Therefore, the use of 'video ensures the de-
fendant of his right to have witnesses speak on his behalf.
While members of the defendant's family are present in the
court and may speak on his behalf at first appearance, the pro-
ceeding is not adversarial in nature.25 The judge has broad discre-
tion to determine the conditions of release 26 and the state rarely, if
at all, presents witnesses against the misdemeanant defendant.
Thus, the issue whether the defendant is deprived of his right to
confront his accusers is not applicable.
McCoy held that the defendant's physical presence before a
witness testifying against him is not necessary to protect the de-
fendant's right to confront the witness. The court relied on Doug-
las v. Alabama,27 which held that while the confrontation clause
secures the right of cross-examination, an adequate opportunity,
for cross-examination may satisfy the clause even in the absence of
physical confrontation. That opportunity existed in McCoy, where
examination of an expert witness by closed-circuit television
placed the defendant's voice and image at the hearing in order to
confront witnesses. Additionally, the opportunity for cross-exami-
nation is safeguarded by closed-circuit television because the pro-
ceeding is live, and because there is no opportunity to filter or edit
the testimony as it occurs.28
24. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.160(a).
25. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(b)(2)(3) provides that the judge shall determine bail on the
basis "of all relevant" factors, including the weight of the evidence against the defendant.
26. Committee Note, FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131.
27. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
28. See Annot., 80 A.L.R. 3d 1212, 1215 (1977).
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The right of the defendant to assistance of counsel is satisfied
where an assistant public defender is present in the prison
throughout the hearing. In Florida, the arraignment of a defendant
is a "critical stage" in a criminal prosecution,2" during which the
accused has the constitutional right to benefit of counsel unless he
competently and intelligently waives his right.30 The Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure provide for the, appointment of counsel at
first appearance and arraignment.
The assistant public defender has been present in the jail for
misdemeanor first appearances since the first use of closed-circuit
television. He arrives prior to the start of a hearing and remains
there until the last case is heard in order to be available to render
legal assistance and to facilitate his appointment to indigent defen-
dants. No indigent criminal defendant can be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment unless the state has afforded him the right to the
assistance of appointed counsel for his defense. 1 To insure this
right, the assistant public defender is present in the jail to inter-
cede on behalf of the defendant who pleads guilty and is sentenced
to additional jail time.
The standard for determining whether the defendant was af-
forded effective assistance of counsel is not that the "counsel [was]
a 'sham and mockery' but whether counsel was reasonably likely to
render and did render reasonably effective counsel based on the
totality of the circumstances." 32
In the "totality of the circumstances," the assistant public de-
fender is capable of rendering reasonably effective counsel. The as-
sistant public defender has access to the same information regard-
ing the defendant's case as he did prior to the video system,
although the new system requires additional effort by the court
clerk and the attorney to ensure that the attorney has the informa-
tion prior to the hearing.3 3 The assistant public defender has with
him a copy of a "booking sheet," the master list of all defendants
heard in that session, and the charging document for each defen-
dant. He may communicate with the clerk during the hearing con-
cerning additional information. Additionally, communication with
the judge, assistant state attorney, or member of the defendant's
29. Sardinia v. State, 168 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1964).
30. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
31. Argensinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), construed in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367 (1979).
32. Meeks v. State, 382 So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1980).
33. Id.
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family is available through the monitor and microphone that the
defendant uses. The assistant public defender may carry on a con-
versation with the judge or assistant state attorney that will not be
heard by others present at the proceeding, and that will not be
recorded on video tape, because of use of a headphone specifically
designed for this purpose. In special circumstances, the assistant
public defender may also request that the defendant be brought
into the court.
The defendant is not deprived of effective assistance merely
because the judge and the defendant do not have personal physical
contact with each other. The assistant public defender's absence
from the courtroom makes it more difficult for him to communi-
cate as quickly with the assistant state attorney. While the televi-
sion screen may not capture nuances in the defendant's demeanor,
the assistant public defender could advise the judge and the prose-
cutor of this information.
Florida Evidence Code section 90.502 (1981) preserves the at-
torney-client privilege in this state. The use of closed-circuit televi-
sion to conduct misdemeanor first appearances does not deprive
the defendant of this privilege. It is technically, possible for the
attorney to conduct discussions with his client in private. Observa-
tion of the system in use confirms that private discussions take
place.
In Kansas City v. McCoy,34 the court found that "[tihe judge
who heard the case in the de novo trial was presented the same
evidence and found that . . . 'calm, judicial decorum was main-
tained throughout the proceedings. . . .'" The use of closed-cir-
cuit television to conduct examination of a witness not present in
the courtroom did not taint the integrity of the proceeding.
Closed-circuit television for first appearances allows the judge
to observe the defendant on a forty-five inch color screen. The
judge can see the defendant's physical features and his clothing; he
can question the defendant as to his employment, financial re-
sources, length of residence in the community, and family relation-
ships. The correctional officer advises the judge of the defendant's
"record of conviction," and any previous bench warrants. While
use of closed-circuit television may prevent the judge from observ-
ing subtle nuances in the defendant's behavior, there is no evi-
dence that the system prevents the judge from assessing his "char-
34. 525 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Mo. 1975).
[Vol. 38:657
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE COURTROOM
acter and mental condition."3 In particularly sensitive situations,
"the defendant will be brought to the courtroom. '36
Rule 2.070(c) of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration
permits the Chief Judge to authorize the use of electronic report-
ing for any proceeding. Video tape recording is one such method.
Authorization for the use of video to record the proceeding can
be found by analogy to rules governing other judicial proceedings.
Rule 3.170(j) authorizes the acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, and reporting by mechanical means in open court.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.310 provides that upon mo-
tion, the court shall order that the testimony at a deposition be
recorded on video tape. The Florida Evidence Code provides that
term "photographs" includes video tape and motion pictures.
Prior to the passage of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
1.310, a court approved the admissibility of videotaped deposition
in trial.3 7 One court admitted the videotape of a witness's testi-
mony at a preliminary hearing as evidence at trial.3" In Paramore
v. State,39 the court upheld the admissibility of a defendant's
video-taped confession.
In light of the ability of video tape to capture a more accurate
record of the proceeding, and to record both the audio and visual
aspects of the proceedings, and in light of the state rules authoriz-
ing its use for this purpose, video tape is a permissible means of
obtaining permanent record of first appearance.
The revised Canon 3A(7) of the Florida Bar Code of Judicial
Conduct sanctions the use of audiovisual equipment to televise
misdemeanor arraignments for the purpose of judicial administra-
tion. ° The commentary states that the revised rule constitutes "a
general authorization for the use of electronic media and still pho-
tography for all purposes, including the purpose expressed as ex-
ceptions in the former Canon." Therefore, electronic media can be
35. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.130(b)(4)(iii). In determining what form of release will reasona-
bly assure appearance, the judge must, on the basis of available information, take into ac-
count the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence
against the defendant, the defendant's family ties, employment, financial resources, charac-
ter and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record of convic-
tions, and his record of appearances at court proceedings, or of flight to avoid prosecution,
or of failure to appear at court proceedings.
36. Memorandum of Judge Marshall T. Ader Supplementing Admin. Order No. 82-12,
at app. 8.
37. Hutchins v. State, 286 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
38. People v. Moran, 39 Cal. App. 3d 398, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413 (Ct. App. 1974).
39. 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969).
40. See supra note 12.
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used for purposes of judicial administration.
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b)(3) authorizes
the Chief Judge of the judicial circuit to enter administrative or-
ders for the "efficient and proper administration of courts within
his circuit." Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.020(c) de-
fines "administrative order" as "a directive necessary to administer
properly the courts' affairs but not inconsistent with the
constitution."
The federal and Florida constitutional rights of the accused
remain intact with the use of closed-circuit television. The system
has advantages that increase administrative efficiency and promote
judicial economy as well. The system reduces the number of court-
rooms and sessions used for jail arraignments without reducing the
number of persons who can be arraigned daily. It also reduces the
number of clerical persons and correctional officers used to assist
in the proceedings and the number of hours used by administrative
personnel to prepare the cases. The system eliminates prior sched-
uling problems and allows the judge to maximize work efficiency.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Flint, Michigan
Michigan State University conducted a major empirical study
of the effects of videotaped presentations upon court personnel on
jurors from the General County Circuit Court (Flint, Michigan)
over a period of four years.41 The academics who conducted this
series of studies (eleven in all) faced considerable general specula-
tion, but had little prior experience with attempting to understand
the phenomenon.42 The research team was extensive in its ap-
proach,43 and the general findings were favorable to the proposi-
41. Miller, Fontes, & Dalinke, Using Videotape in the Courtroom: A Four-Year Test
Pattern, 55 U. DET. J. URB. L. 655 (1978).
42. An example of such speculation concerned the effects of the type of medium
employed:
Though no specific theoretical expectations were advanced, several lines of
thought suggest that jurors may respond differently to diverse modes of trial
presentation. McLuhan, for example, asserts that since the medium itself is the
primary message in communicative transaction, differences in the medium of
presentation employed will have a pervasive impact on the way perceptions are
formed, information is processed, and judgments are rendered by the communi-
cators. To date, however, there has been little empirical research investigating
these effects, particularly in terms of live as opposed to mediated experiences.
Id. at 659.
43. The research was comprehensive:
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tion that the courts can approach symbiotic positioning using
video technology. The team observed that "no evidence indicates
that videotaped presentations exert a deleterious effect on the
courtroom communication between trial participants and jurors,
nor does videotape appear to exercise a negative impact on juror
decision-making process. 44
Specifically, the researchers found that the juror's experience
was not terribly altered because of the use of this technology,4 5 nor
did the type of technology used,46 or the manner of use, : affect the
outcome of the proceedings. Further examination of the relation-
ship between video and the courts is necessary.*"
B. Dade County, Florida
As part of its evaluation mandate, the Office of the Miami-
Dade Criminal Justice Council prepared a questionnaire that was
to assess the perceptions of the video system by the participants in
the misdemeanor arraignment setting.49 The criteria on which the
The eleven studies included in this report are organized according to five
major research foci: (1) studies comparing juror responses to various modes, or
combinations, of trial presentation; (2) studies examining the effects of deleting
inadmissible testimony, and the influence of diverse techniques for editing such
testimony; (3) studies investigating juror retention of trial-related information as
a function of the presentational mode; (4) studies examining the impact of paral-
inguistic and nonverbal cues on juror evaluation of witness credibility under di-
verse modes of presentation; and (5) studies investigating the potential influence
of alternative video production techniques or juror response.
Id. at 658 (footnotes omitted).
44. Id. at 696.
45. "[J]urors viewing a videotaped trial, when compared to their live trial counterparts,
arrived at similar verdicts, had similar perceptions of trial participants, retained at least as
much trial-related information, and also expressed similar levels of interest and motiva-
tion." Id.
46. "[Slplit-screen and full-screen videotape presentations are equally effective for
presenting evidence in court." Id.
47. "Finally, . . . preliminary findings suggest that video production techniques do not
exert a dramatic effect on a juror's perception of trial participants, or the ultimate outcome
of civil litigation." Id. at 697.
48. As was noted:
It should be stressed, however, that research has just been commenced in this
area. Moreover, the problems are complex, and the most prudent initial strategy
probably lies in legislating for uniformity in the use of videotape which will stip-
ulate a fixed camera system. Perhaps by having a presentation formula constant
for all trial participants, questions about the influence of "editorial" judgments
and the possible inequities resulting from wealthier participants retaining pro-
fessional taping advice may be circumvented.
Id. at 697-98.
49. Questionnaires were given to county court judges, a sample of defendants, and all
the assistant state attorneys and assistant public defenders assigned to the county court.
19841
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
questions were based included the physical aspects-audio and vis-
ual clarity, courtroom demeanor, comfort/ease with the use of the
system, length of arraignments, security, and inmates' understand-
ing of the process."
The attorneys representing the public defender's office and
state attorney's office generally agree on the advantages and disad-
vantages to this new system. The main complaint voiced by these
two offices is that video depersonalizes the contact between the
parties in the courtroom and those in the jail. Part of the problem
occurs because the assistant state attorneys and assistant public
defenders cannot hear or see each other clearly." This can easily
be corrected if the parties involved request the necessary technical
adjustments, such as turning up the volume or moving the camera.
The respondents' feeling that personal contact is lost may be
due to technical limitations in the system. The parties commented
that they did not have an overall view of the proceeding. The judge
cannot see all of the defendants. The assistant public defender
cannot see the assistant state attorney, thus hampering communi-
cation. To correct this problem, the court could purchase a wide
angle lens and give remote control of the camera and microphone
in the jail to the console technician.
The need for all parties involved to be sensitive to the new
system is apparent. Complaints that the judge goes too fast and
does not involve the assistant public defender in his talks with the
assistant state attorney or pretrial staff may be remedied with time
and increased judicial experience.
All respondents to the questionnaire agreed that video de-
creases the number of courtroom disruptions and increases the
ability of the judge to focus on one defendant and conduct his case
exhaustively. Because the defendants are not being jammed into
holding cells behind each courtroom, there is a perceived humane-
ness in this system.
V. CONCLUSION
Videotaping misdemeanor arraignments should be continued.
The increase in efficiency of judicial time, the cost savings, and the
50. Responses were obtained from thirty-six inmates, twelve judges, eight assistant
state attorneys, and nine assistant public defenders. The responses are numerically de-
scribed infra in Tables A-E.
51. See infra Table A. It is interesting to compare the responses of the defendants
concerning the adequacy of the audio-video components of the system with those responses
of the attorneys (public defenders) representing those same defendants.
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additional advantages, more than outweigh the disadvantages. The
evaluators agree that the defendant is not deprived of the legal
rights afforded him at regular misdemeanor first appearances.
The system has dealt only with misdemeanant processing to
date. Future planning should analyze the use of electronic devices
for felony bond hearings, and hearings involving juveniles or
women, who are lodged far from the courthouse. This would cut
down on the cost of transportation and avoid security problems




52. A memorandum dated June 20, 1983 from County Court Judge Harvey Baxter to
Chief Judge Gerald T. Wetherington outlined recommendations for a new jail video system.
The proposed system incorporates the use of microwaves to transmit signals from remote
facilities to the courthouse.
* Executive Director of Office of the Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council. B.A. 1967,
M.P.A. 1969, Ph.D. 1972, New York University.
** Special Projects Administrator for the Office of the Dade-Miami Criminal Justice
Council. B.A. 1972, University of Florida; M.A. 1975, Michigan State University; M.B.A.
1982, Florida International University.
*** B.A. 1976, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1982, University of Miami.
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CROSS-TABULATION OF RESPONDENT GROUP




AUDIO ADEQUACY OF VIDEO SYSTEM
RESPONDENT GROUP (# OF RESPONDENTS)
State Public
Opinion Judges (10) Attorney (8) Defender (9) Defendants (36)
Agree 90 50 0 75
Neutral 0 12.5 11.1 8.3
Disagree 10 37.5 88.9 16.7
No Reponse 0 0 0 0
B
VISUAL ADEQUACY OF VIDEO SYSTEM
RESPONDENT GROUP (# OF RESPONDENTS)
State Public
Opinion Judges (10) Attorney (8) Defender (9) Defendants (36)
Agree 90 62.5 22.2 86.1
Neutral 0 0 0 5.6
Disagree 10 37.5 77.8 8.3
No Reponse 0 0 0 0
C
COURT DISRUPTED DUE TO NOISE IN JAIL
RESPONDENT GROUP (# OF RESPONDENTS)
State
Opinion Judges (10) Attorney (8) Defendants (36)
Agree 20 23.5 19.4
Neutral 10 29.4 11.1
Disagree 70 47.1 66.7
No Response 0 0 2.8
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